Annual Survey Of Antitrust
Developments 1975-76 by Shenefield, John H. & Hartwell,, Ray V., III
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 34 | Issue 1 Article 3
Winter 1-1-1977
Annual Survey Of Antitrust Developments
1975-76
John H. Shenefield
Ray V. Hartwell, III
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
John H. Shenefield and Ray V. Hartwell, III, Annual Survey Of Antitrust Developments 1975-76, 34
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 7 (1977), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol34/iss1/3
ANNUAL SURVEY OF ANTITRUST
DEVELOPMENTS 1975-76
JoHN H. SHENEFIELD*
AND RAY V. HARTWELL, III**
Antitrust during the year 1975-76 continued to be the subject of
debate and the cause of controversy in courtrooms and legislatures
around the country. Candidates for public office spoke enthusiasti-
cally of the need for more vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws
to counter inflationary pressures and improve the stagnant perform-
ance of the economy. But it was a year more notable for developments
on the legislative front than for precedent-making decisions from the
courts.
The 1975-76 Term of the Supreme Court produced one antitrust
decision of major importance, Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.I In that
opinion, the Court grappled with the awkward conflict between the
federal antitrust laws and regulation at the state level. The Court has
apparently once again given voice to the fundamental national policy
favoring competition, but has in the process put into doubt the valid-
ity of many state regulatory programs hitherto thought immune from
the application of the antitrust laws by virtue of the state action
doctrine enunciated in Parker v. Brown.2 Not the least of the dis-
quieting questions raised by the decision is the extent of personal
liability on the part of state officials and private citizens who are
apparently to be subjected to the conflicting demands of two orders
of legal authority.
The real action, however, was in the halls of Congress. Legislation
to revise, repeal or strengthen the antitrust laws tumbled into the
legislative hoppers in an unending stream. In the end, a bill of major
importance in the development of the antitrust laws was passed. In
addition, a large number of proposals seeking to reestablish the
preeminence of competition in regulated industries and moving in the
direction of even more vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws
was seriously considered, and may well become law in the next
Congress.
* Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia; A.B. (1960), LL.B. (1965), Harvard
University.
** Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia; B.A. (1969), J.D. (1975), Washington
& Lee University.
96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
2 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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And so the trend this past year, both in the courts and in Con-
gress, has been in the direction of removing the barriers to enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws. Our survey analyzes the inroads Cantor
has made on the state action immunities conferred by Parker. But
we pause to examine the year's legislative activities, also ostensibly
designed to remove impediments to antitrust enforcement. These
congressional efforts may in the long run more directly affect the
functioning of this nation's economy than the year's Supreme Court
decisions, perhaps more than any other legislative activity in the
antitrust area since the enactment in 1950 of the Celler-Kefauver
amendments to § 7 of the Clayton Act.
I.
ANTITRUST LEGISLATION IN THE NINETY-FOURTH
CONGRESS
The 94th Congress came to Washington clearly in the mood to
pass some antitrust legislation. It was exposed early in the first
session to a wide variety of proposals seeking to vindicate the primacy
of competition policy. These proposals ranged from bills seeking to
amend the antitrust laws directly in an effort to invigorate antitrust
enforcement, to proposals to deregulate major industries, such as
surface transportation and aviation.
Of the vast number of proposals considered by the 94th Congress,
three important bills became law. The most far-reaching of these was
the so-called Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976. 3 In addition, Congress passed a proposal to repeal the Fair
Trade Act exemption.' Finally, of the many proposals that would
have affected regulated industries, Congress adopted a major bill to
restructure regulation of the nation's railroads.'
A. Some Interesting Near-Misses
Some of the proposals that failed of enactment in the 94th Con-
gress also deserve attention, because it is predictable that many of
them will find their way once again into the legislative process during
the 95th Congress. One of the most interesting never actually was
This legislation adopted a number of procedural proposals that are designed to
strengthen antitrust enforcement at both the federal and state levels. Pub. L. No. 94-
435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975).
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act, 45 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.
(Pub. L. No. 94-210) (1976).
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introduced as proposed legislation. Instead, the suggestions of
amendment or repeal of the Robinson-Patman Act' were considered
and debated on Capitol Hill in a series of hearings by the Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on Antitrust, the Robinson-Patman Act and Related
Matters, created by the House Committee on Small Business, and in
the Executive Branch at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. Be-
ginning at least with the publication of the Report of the Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws in 1955,1
the Robinson-Patman Act had been subjected to considerable criti-
cism by those who regard some incidents of price discrimination as
forms of desirable price competition. The authors of the Report
pointed out that price discrimination might well, depending on the
particular circumstances, either stimulate effective competition or be
evidence of effective monopoly. The Report refused to regard all price
discrimination as evil and sought instead an evaluation of each in-
stance of price discrimination to determine whether it had pro- or
anti-competitive consequences.
A rising crescendo of criticism8 of the Act resulted for the first time
in proposals for revision being considered by this session of Congress.
In 1975, lawyers from the Justice Department, including the then-
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division,
Thomas E. Kauper, began delivering addresses criticizing the
Robinson-Patman Act and suggesting various reforms. In a report
"Reform of the Robinson-Patman Act,"' from the Antitrust Division,
three possible options for change in the law of price discrimination
were discussed. The first proposal was outright repeal. The second
option called for the enactment of the Predatory Practices Act in
15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1970).
Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws, (March 31, 1955) [hereinafter cited as "Attorney General's Report'].
'Among the many commentaries that have taken issue with the philosophy of the
Robinson-Patman Act or its administration are the following representative samples:
Levi, The Robinson-Patman Act - Is It in the Public Interest?, 1 ABA ANTrrRusT
SEcTION REPORT 60 (1952); Elman, The Robinson-Patman Act and Antitrust Policy: A
Time for Reappraisal, 42 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1966); Rowe, The Federal Trade Commis-
sion's Administration of the Anti-Price Discrimination Law, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 415
(1964); Anonymous, Eine Kleine Juristische Schlummergeschichte, 79 HARv. L. REV.
921 (1966); Austern, Presumption and Percipience About Competitive Effect Under
Section 2 of the Clayton Act, 81 HARv. L. REV. 733 (1968).
Both the Neal Report and the Stigler Report recommended substantial revision
of the Robinson-Patman Act. See Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust
Policy and Report of the Task Force on Productivity and Competition, both reprinted
in 1 J. OF REPRIs FOR ANrRUsT L. & ECON. (Winter 1969).
1 Noted at 13 HARv. J. LEGIS. 125, 126 (1975).
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substitution for the Robinson-Patman Act. That Act" would have
focused on the primary line offenses under existing price discrimina-
tion law, and in particular on predatory geographic pricing and sales
below cost. The new legislation, however, would have made new
entry, meeting competition and absence of anticompetitive effect de-
fenses to allegations of unlawful predatory pricing.
The third option was the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act
Reform Statute." This proposal included much of the Predatory
Practices Act but in addition contained sections governing customer-
level competition. The proposal differs from the Robinson-Patman
Act in that the discrimination must be significant in amount and part
of a pattern of systematically favoring larger recipients, with the clear
effect of threatening the elimination of competitors.
In late 1975, the Domestic Council Review Group held hearings
which were largely inconclusive. At this point, the proponents of the
Robinson-Patman Act in Congress began to hold hearings of their
own, particularly in the House, and it was evident that any proposal
for full-scale reform of the Robinson-Patman Act was in for rough
weather. No bill was ever introduced. But the clash between those
whose primary concern was vigorous price competition, and those
who are concerned lest small business be disfavored in competition
with larger concerns is one that may be expected to continue into the
next Congress.
Among the other pieces of proposed legislation that did not pass
were a large variety of proposals for deregulation. For some time, the
regulated industries have been subjected to heavy criticism. Legal
and economic critics 2 have argued that regulation is inefficient and
results in higher prices for the consumer. Nothing in recent years has
done much to lessen the force of these arguments, and, in particular,
the combination of rapid inflation and resource shortages has added
fuel to the fire. Congress thus considered a wide variety of major
proposals to alter or eliminate traditional regulatory mechanisms.
Many of these proposals took the form of mandating complete repeal
ID Hearings, Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Antitrust, the Robinson-Patman Act and
Related Matters, Nov. 19, 1975, Part I, pp. 590-91.
" Id. at 591-93.
ID See, e.g., Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548
(1969); Adams, The Role of Competition in the Regulated Industries, American Econ.
Assoc. Proc. 1958 at 527; Stigler & Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The
Case of Electricity, 5 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1962); Peck, Competitive Policy for Transporta-
tion?, reprinted in P. MAcAvoY, THE Caisis OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1970);
A. PHILLIPS (ed.), PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS (1975).
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of the regulatory scheme or substantial revision of the procedures
involved in regulatory decision-making.
Among the most interesting of these was the Competition Im-
provements Act of 1976,'1 which sought to force regulatory agencies
to emphasize much more strongly the competitive impact of agency
action in the decision-making process. Although considerably revised
from its original and quite extreme form, the bill that was eventually
approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee prohibited any agency
action that would have the effect of creating or maintaining "a situa-
tion involving a significant burden on competition,"'" unless it was
found that the action was necessary to accomplish a fundamental and
overriding statutory purpose, the anticompetitive effects were clearly
outweighed in the public interest by demonstrable benefits, and the
objectives of the agency action could not be accomplished by less
anticompetitive means. If the standards of the Act were not met, the
Attorney General had the power to force a hearing in which the
agency would have the burden of establishing that the requirements
had been satisfied. This effort to highlight competitive policies at the
expense of all others was predictably much criticized, although it
made its way through several layers of the committee structure with-
out sacrificing its basic premise. The chances are good that similar
proposals will reappear in the next session.
B. Regulatory Reform
Proposals for outright regulatory reform focused on particular in-
dustries. The Administration and proponents of regulatory reform in
Congress suggested substantial revision of the regulatory schemes
affecting commercial airlines,"' the motor carrier industry," the fi-
nancial community, 7 and the petroleum industry."
Because the proposals for the railroad industry were enacted and
because they are typical of many of the proposals for deregulation,
'* S. 2028, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
" Id., § 3(a).
' The Aviation Act, S. 2551, 94th Cong. See also H.R. 10261, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976).
" The Motor Carrier Reform Act, S. 2929 and H.R. 10909, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
(1975).
'7 The Financial Institutions Act of 1975, S. 1267, 94th Cong. (1975).
" A large number of proposals were introduced to alter the structure of the oil
industry with the intended objective of making the industry more competitive. Among
these were the Petroleum Industry Competition Act, S. 2387, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); The Interfuel Competition Act of 1975, S. 489, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); and
The Oil Pricing Act of 1975, H.R. 9777, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
1977]
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the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 merits
scrutiny." The 1976 Act was an omnibus bill intended to assist in the
rehabilitation of the railroads' physical facilities, to improve the effi-
ciency of the operations of the nation's rail lines and to restore the
financial stability of the railroad system. But the most dramatic
aspects of the legislation are the provisions for regulatory reform and
deregulation. The highlight is the provision enabling the railroads to
enjoy greater freedom to raise or lower rates for rail services in com-
petitive markets. As long as rates contribute to the "going concern
value," a phrase not defined in the Act, the rate is held to be lawful,
and any rate equaling or exceeding "variable cost" is to be presumed
to satisfy the standard. Most importantly, § 205 of the Act provides
that no rate is to be held up to a particular level to protect "the traffic
of any other carrier or mode of transportation."
Maximum rates may not be disallowed unless the Interstate Com-
merce Commission first finds that the carrier has "market domi-
nance" over the relevant service. And perhaps most dramatically, the
ICC's power to suspend operation of newer rates is to be held in
abeyance for the next two years so long as the proposed new rates do
not vary more than 7 percent annually. Innovative ratemaking is
encouraged by a section of the Act ordering the ICC to establish
standards for rates based on seasonal, regional or peak-period de-
mand, and the railroads are permitted to file separate rates for dis-
tinct rail services to promote competitive pricing."0
The effect is to relax rate regulation, and to permit a band of
reasonableness within which individual firms are permitted the free-
dom to raise or lower rates without government control. The protec-
tionist philosophy of rate review that had been attributed to the ICC
in recent decades is obviously to be replaced by an emphasis on
competition, so long as rates are compensatory.
Whether the other segments of the transportation industry will get
in the next Congress the same treatment railroads received in the
94th Congress remains to be seen. But if the entire transportation
deregulation package becomes law, the transportation industries of
this country will be subjected to the rigors of competition in a new
and promising way. Given the performance of these industries in
recent years, and the regulatory anomalies associated with their gov-
1" 45 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., Pub. L. No. 94-210 (1976).
21 Other provisions of the Act provide for reform of the ICC and its procedures and
a comprehensive study of the railway system to examine such questions as its financial
health and stability, the benefits of electrification for high-density rail lines and the
benefits to be expected from mergers and other forms of coordination.
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ernance by regulatory commissions in Washington, the new era of
increased competition is very much welcome.
C. Repeal of Fair Trade
In yet another area, the 94th Congress opened the doors to compe-
tition. For many years, state-enacted fair trade laws created an ex-
ception to the rule that agreements between manufacturers and inde-
pendent distributors specifying prices at which goods could be resold
violated the federal antitrust laws. Generally, these laws prohibited
loss leaders, outlawed price wars and permitted trademark owners to
protect the reputation of their products by holding resale prices to a
premium level. Federal sanction for these laws, which ran counter to
the Sherman Act, was provided by Congress in the Miller-Tydings
Act2' in 1937, and after that legislation ran into antitrust headwinds,2
the McGuire Act.Y
The combination of constitutional difficulty and the problems
and expense involved for manufacturers who attempted to enforce a
fair trade program gradually led to a reassessment of the value of fair
trade laws. The Attorney General's Committee to Study the Anti-
trust Laws, while acknowledging that the fair trade legislation re-
flected "legitimate commercial aims," generally disapproved of fair
trade pricing to achieve protection for trademark owners .2 The Com-
mittee saw the fair trade scheme as preventing desirable promotional
price cutting, and leading in some circumstances to the extinguish-
ment of price competition altogether. The Committee thus advocated
repeal of both the Miller-Tydings and the McGuire Acts.
The criticism of the fair trade laws that had built over the years
resulted during the 94th Congress in the outright repeal of the exemp-
tion. Introduced by Senator Brooke as the Consumer Goods Pricing
Act,2 the legislation removed the exemptions and thus invalidated
all fair trade programs prospectively. Testimony before the Subcom-
mittee on Antitrust and Monopolies estimated that the abolition of
the fair trade laws would benefit consumers by an estimated $2 bil-
lion annually.
21 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), 50 Stat. 693 (1937).
22 See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
2 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), 66 Stat. 632 (1952).
21 Attorney General's Report, supra note 7, at 153-54.
21 Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975).
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D. The Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976
By far the most significant step taken by the 94th Congress to
increase the influence of antitrust on the nation's economy was the
enactment of the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.5 Known as the
Hart-Scott-Rodino bill because a number of different proposals were
combined to give it its ultimate form, the original bill was introduced
on March 21, 1975, by Senators Hart and Scott in the Senate as S.
1284.2 A similar bill was introduced by Congressman Rodino in the
House as H.R. 8532. Eventually, after a vigorous lobbying effort from
many different sources including private industry, and a period of
consideration filled with innovative and, to the casual observer, oft-
times hilarious parliamentary maneuverings, the House bill was sub-
stituted for the Senate version and became law when the President
approved it on September 30, 1976.n
The legislation increases the effectiveness of antitrust enforce-
ment procedures, rather than altering substantive antitrust law."9 By
increasing the powers of the Department of Justice both to investi-
gate alleged antitrust violations and to review in advance plans for
large mergers, the Act recognizes past limitations on the Antitrust
Division imposed by sometimes meager resources and out-of-date
investigatory mechanisms. However, the Act also permits state
attorneys general to sue for federal antitrust violations on behalf of
the natural persons in a state. It thus opens the door to a kind of class
action without any of the procedural safeguards that have kept the
class action from becoming totally unwieldy and unfair.
Title I of the Act significantly improved the investigatory mecha-
nisms available to the Department of Justice. The Antitrust Civil
25 Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
" S. 1284, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
21 The legislative history is amusing. H.R. 8532, originally only a parens patriae
bill, was first passed by the House. The Senate amended the House bill by substituting
a Senate version that went far beyond the original parens patriae provisions of the
House proposal and called for premerger review and a variety of other miscellaneous
antitrust revisions. But the House countered by passing two more bills that dealt with
some of the issues addressed by the Senate version, and then substituted the entire
House package for the Senate version when it was returned to the House. Instead of
responding to the House's invitation to name conferees to work out conflicts, in order
to avoid additional filibusters (there had already been three), the Senate took up the
House bill without conference, made several amendments, passed it and sent it back
to the House, which concurred in the amendments and passed the legislation on to the
President.
" Interestingly, the original bills sought to change the substantive requirements
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, but these provisions were eliminated from the final
version.
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Process Act of 19623 permitted precomplaint civil investigative de-
mands to be served only for documents to determine whether the
respondent was in violation of the antitrust laws. That law was found
deficient by antitrust prosecutors in several important respects. First,
to the extent that mergers constituted future antitrust violations, the
law apparently did not permit the issuance of a CID.3' In addition,
the CID power being limited to documents, no person could be called
upon to testify. Perhaps most importantly, CID's could only be issued
to those legal entities thought to be in violation of the antitrust laws,
and not to third parties whose evidence with respect to any possible
violation might be illuminating.
The 1976 amendments remedied these defects. Section 3(a) of the
Act permits CID's to be issued to "any person" who may be "in
possession, custody, or control of any documentary material, or may
have any information, relevant to a civil antitrust investigation." In
addition, in a further expansion of investigative powers for the Divi-
sion, § 3(a) permits a civil investigative demand to require such
person
• . . to produce such documentary material for inspection and
copying or reproduction, to answer in writing written interro-
gatories, to give oral testimony concerning documentary mate-
rial or information, or to furnish any combination of such ma-
terial, answers, or testimony.
The effect of the language is to permit civil investigative demands to
be directed to natural persons as well as business entities, and to
third parties rather than only to the suspected violators, and further-
more, to permit the taking of sworn oral testimony. Any respondent
required to give oral testimony may be accompanied by counsel who
may advise in connection with the questions and may raise objec-
tions. Finally, the law expressly permits investigation of activities "in
preparation for a merger, acquisition, joint venture, or similar trans-
action, which, if consummated, may result in an antitrust viola-
tion."32
These amendments are long overdue. Many state antitrust laws
have contained for some years the kinds of discovery and investiga-
tory mechanisms now placed in the federal arsenal for the first time.
The rather pathetic capacity of the Department of Justice to investi-
gate a suspected violation clearly reduced the effectiveness of enforce-
15 U.S.C. § 1311 et seq. (1970).
1' United States v. Union Oil Co., 343 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1965).
312 Pub. L. No. 94-435, 89 Stat. 1383, § 3(b)(1)(B)(1976).
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ment activity, since adequate evidence can rarely be obtained from
an unexplained compilation of company documents.
Moreover, the Department of Justice, before the enactment of
these amendments, was forced either to file a complaint or to convene
a grand jury in order to obtain fuller discovery. Filing a complaint in
advance of adequate knowledge as to the existence of a violation is
at the least unethical, and required defendants who might ultimately
prove their innocence to expend major resources unnecessarily, with
all the attendant publicity, rather than permitting the Antitrust Di-
vision, with more precise tools, to inquire into the existence of a
violation at the outset. The convening of a grand jury without reason
to believe that a criminal case might be in the offing was in all
probability illegal. While the new discovery mechanisms will benefit
antitrust enforcement, there can be little doubt that they will also
benefit defendants, since by more complete discovery at earlier stages
of proceedings, it is likely that major expense and legal problems on
both sides can be avoided.
Title II of the Act providing for pre-merger notification and an
automatic pause before the completion of a transaction is more con-
troversial. Prior to the enactment of Title I, pursuant to a 1969
Federal Trade Commission resolution,33 firms of a certain size con-
templating merger were required to notify the Federal Trade Com-
mission in advance. Corporations generally complied with the pre-
merger notification requirement of the FTC, but it was not clear how
strictly the notification requirements were enforced nor how complete
the reports to the FTC actually were. Early versions of the Antitrust
Improvements Act not only called for pre-merger notification, but
also required courts in which acquisitions had been challenged to
issue automatic temporary restraining orders, with a shift of the bur-
den of proof on the ensuing motion for preliminary injunction from
the government to the defendant. In addition, the original proposals
contained a provision that would almost always have resulted in an
automatic hold-separate order and would have required any losing
defendant to yield up the benefits of the temporary acquisition. Both
of these early provisions were eliminated from the final version.
Nevertheless, Title II was not without controversy. In general,
Title II applies in any merger transaction if one of the firms has total
net annual sales or assets of at least $10 million and the other firm
3 Fed. Reg. Doc. 69-5617, May 9, 1969, superseded by 37 Fed. Reg. 7951 (Apr. 21,
1972), supplemented by 38 Fed. Reg. 5513 (March 1, 1973), superseded by 39 Fed. Reg.
35717 (Oct. 3, 1974).
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has annual net sales or total assets of at least $100 million." In addi-
tion, the Act does not apply unless the acquiring company ends up
with either $15 million or 15 percent, or more, of the acquired com-
pany's voting securities or assets.
New § 7A of the Clayton Act, added by Title II of the Antitrust
Improvements legislation, now prohibits any acquisition subject to
the Act unless the parties have filed notification and the waiting
period prescribed in the legislation has expired. The waiting period
automatically begins on the day of the receipt by the FTC and the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of
either a completed notification, or a partial notification and a state-
ment of reasons for noncompliance, from both parties to the acquisi-
tion, and ends on the thirtieth day after the date of receipt.3 The
FTC is required to prescribe the contents of the notification, and the
Act provides for severe penalties for noncompliance with the pre-
merger notification provisions. In addition, the Act calls for expedited
handling of anti-merger suits in the federal district courts, so that
lengthy delays in resolving the legality of acquisitions will be avoided.
Finally, Title II provides for twelve categories of exemption, mostly
related to acquisitions for investment and acquisitions approved by
federal regulatory agencies.
Title II represents an effort to accommodate conflicting, yet en-
tirely legitimate concerns. The Department of Justice and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission point out that existing law makes difficult the
attainment of injunctive relief in merger cases. Moreover, frequently
the enforcement authorities only discover the existence of a potential
violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act through a chance story in the press,
and by the time an investigation can be initiated and facts gathered,
the merger transaction is completed. The result is that the Depart-
ment of Justice comes into court seeking to unscramble an already
accomplished amalgamation, undoubtedly making courts more re-
luctant to grant injunctive relief. On the other hand, business firms
undertaking to merge are very much aware that time is of the essence.
Negotiations are frequently so delicate that even the most minute
delays can result in all sorts of unexpected .problems. Many have
argued, therefore, that the automatic waiting periods required by
Title II would make acquisitions much more difficult.
2 In the event nonmanufacturing firms are involved, assets are used as the only
measure.
1 In the case of a tender offer, the waiting period ends on the fifteenth day after
receipt.
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In fairness, it should be said that commencement of the waiting
period need not await the completion of the transaction. Submission
of material alone is sufficient to start the period. Thus, two firms
contemplating acquisition could compile the necessary materials
early in the preparation stage and submit them to the Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. The waiting period
could thus be ended before the closing of the merger transaction.
Moreover, the early submission of relevant material, and the re-
sulting conferences that are likely to ensue, may avoid the possibility
that the enforcement authorities will go into court seeking temporary
bars to what ultimately may turn out to be wholly legal transactions.
Thus again, it can be argued that the pre-merger notification and
waiting period provisions are beneficial to business firms, and not just
new enforcement tools for federal antitrust authorities.
By far the most controversial of the provisions of the new Act is
Title III, which permits state attorneys general to sue for damages
incurred by citizens of their states as the result of violations of the
Sherman Act. Much of the heat generated in connection with this
title focused on provisions no longer in the Act. 6 Nevertheless, the
provisions that remained were the subject of continued criticism and
heavy lobbying up to the day the legislation was signed into law by
the President.
Section 301 of Title III amends § 4 of the Clayton Act by adding
a new § 4C which provides that any attorney general may sue "as
parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in such state" to
recover damages for injury sustained by reason of a violation of the
Sherman Act. The court is required by the new law to exclude from
the amount of damages any duplicative relief awarded for the same
injury, as well as any damages properly allocable to natural persons
who have opted out of the state proceeding and any damages properly
allocable to any business entity.
First, it is obvious that these provisions are carefully hedged in
with a number of limiting concepts. No new antitrust violations are
created. Whereas § 4 of the Clayton Act permits recoveries by "any
person," the new bill permits recoveries only by "natural persons."
I, Included among these provisions were permission to sue on behalf of the "gen-
eral economy" of the state, authorization of contingent fee arrangements for outside
attorneys, provisions for requiring the Attorney General of the United States to insti-
tute suit when a state attorney general had not done so, authority for the state attorney
general to institute damage suits on behalf of business entities in the state and provi-
sion for recovery of "aggregate damages" for all suits certified as class actions under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Whereas § 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes recoveries based on viola-
tions of the "antitrust laws," the new law authorizes recoveries only
for violations of the Sherman Act. The legislation as eventually
passed permits only monetary relief, although earlier versions had
included other relief such as, possibly, restitution, injunctive relief or
other equitable relief.
The traditional defense arguments concerning standing and direct
injury are apparently not available in parens patriae actions inas-
much as the state attorney general is expressly given standing to sue.
Moreover, to read a direct injury requirement into the Act would
apparently render it meaningless in a large majority of cases. Fur-
thermore, the requirements of privity between plaintiff and defen-
dant adopted by some courts are not likely to be used in connection
with parens patriae actions and may not be necessary in light of the
fact that the bill prohibits duplicative recoveries.
The state may sue for treble damages and the cost of suit, includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee. Damages are to be measured, accord-
ing to § 4D of the Act, at least in connection with allegations of price
fixing, "in the aggregate by statistical or sampling methods, by the
computation of illegal overcharges, or by such other reasonable sys-
tem of estimating aggregate damages as the court in its discretion
may permit. . . ."The state is thus not required to prove separately
the individual claims of damaged persons on whose behalf the suit is
brought.
Section 4E of the Clayton Act now provides that monetary relief
recovered in parens patriae actions is to be distributed as the district
court may in its discretion decide or, being deemed a civil penalty by
the court, it may be deposited with the state as general revenues. In
either event, the law imposes a requirement that there be available
a reasonable opportuntity to each natural person on whose behalf
recoveries were obtained to secure his appropriate portion of the dam-
age award.
The Act also provides for notice to be given to all potential mem-
bers of the plaintiff group by publication, and in the event the court
finds such notice inadequate on due process of law grounds, the court
is authorized to direct further notice as may be appropriate in the
circumstances of the case. After notice, any person on whose behalf
an action is brought may elect to exclude himself from the case, and
final judgment in the action is res judicata only as to any person on
whose behalf the action was brought and who fails to give notice of
exclusion. Settlements of parens patriae litigation must be approved
by the court.
Interestingly, the definition section of the Act, now contained in
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§ 4G of the Clayton Act, defines state attorney general to include any
person authorized by state law to bring actions under the Act, but
excludes any person employed or retained on a contingency fee basis,
"unless the amount of the award of a reasonable attorney's fee to a
prevailing plaintiff is determined by the court under the Act." The
Act also provides for a reasonable attorney's fee to a prevailing
defendant upon a finding that the state attorney general had acted
"in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.
'1 -
1
The thrust of this legislation appears to be directed more toward
forcing antitrust violators to "cough up ill-gotten gains" than in pro-
viding compensation for consumers. As such, it more nearly resem-
bles a criminal prosecution than civil litigation for recovery of dam-
ages. While perhaps theoretically sound, the prospect of treble dam-
ages being recovered by the state attorney general on behalf of what
may amount to millions of state residents is a new form of exposure
that must leave serious observers of the antitrust scene at least
slightly uneasy.
While compromises during consideration of the legislation pro-
duced a number of safeguards, the absence of the kind of restraints
for parens patriae actions that are mandated by Rule 23 for federal
class actions is not at all reassuring. And, though not a class action
in form, the parens patriae suit will produce precisely the same bur-
dens upon the judicial system as a class action, but presumably does
not permit courts to avoid those burdens by finding lack of managea-
bility, inadequate notice, or inferiority of the form of action as a
vehicle for recovery.
The major means of lessening the burden is new § 4D of the
Clayton Act permitting measurement of damages in the aggregate,
which itself is alarming. It is perhaps here that the confusion between
the deterrent and penal effects of this legislation and the compensa-
tory nature of other antitrust laws is most serious. Gone are the
requirements that individual plaintiffs prove actual damage together
with the option of a defendant to contest each damage claim on the
merits. The legislation is devoid of any clues as to the result where
different statistical sampling methods produce radically contradic-
tory results. Thus the deterrent effect of potentially ruinous recover-
ies is permitted in cases where the burden of proof is that tradition-
ally found in civil litigation, the weight of the evidence, and not the
stricter reasonable doubt standard found in criminal cases. One won-
ders whether the increased criminal penalties found in the Antitrust
, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 4C(d)(2), 90 Stat. 1383, 1395 (1976).
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Penalties and Procedures Act of 1974 might not be adequate deter-
rence for antitrust violators. One wonders, too, whether the sampling
provisions of the parens patriae law will withstand due process chal-
lenge.
While it is easy to sound alarmist in discussing legislation of this
sort, it will be necessary to follow the effects of this Act closely. If
attorneys bringing such actions are consistently awarded enormous
counsel fees while the natural persons on whose behalf the suits are
filed rarely if ever attain any recovery of substance, then one might
ask whether the antitrust laws ought to be used to transfer wealth
from corporate defendants to private law firms. But it is too early to
assume that result, or that the attorneys general of the states will
permit their own citizens to be mistreated in favor of lawyers han-
dling the states' business.
Most important of all will be the assessment of whether the huge
damage awards meted out as punishment really fit the crime of price
fixing. If firms are to be sent into bankruptcy as the result of price
fixing violations and parens patriae litigation, the Congress will
surely wish to reconsider whether it intended violation of the Sher-
man Act to be a capital offense.
The Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, together with the other
legislation considered and passed in the antitrust area by the 94th
Congress, shows that the tide is running in favor of strong antitrust
enforcement. Both presidential candidates made much of the need
for vigorous antitrust enforcement in their campaigns, and the new
President may be expected to place strong emphasis on this policy
during his administration. Exciting new legislative developments in
the years to come are likely to be the result.
II.
THE CANTOR DECISION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE STATE
ACTION DOCTRINE
Paralleling the criticism of protective economic regulation at the
federal level in recent years has been a series of attacks, on constitu-
tional" and antitrust39 grounds, on various state statutes and eco-
nomic regulations thought to restrict competition unjustifiably. A
' E.g., Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 96
S.Ct. 1817 (1976); Consumers Union, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, No. 75-0105-R (E.D.
Va., filed Feb. 27, 1975); American Motors Sales Corp. v. Division of Motor Vehicles,
No. 76-0513-R (E.D. Va., filed Nov. 4, 1976).
31 E.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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number of state schemes, particularly those involving occupational
licensing0 and restrictions on advertising,4 have succumbed to con-
stitutional challenges. On the other hand, efforts to subject those
implementing or complying with such schemes to antitrust liability
have often foundered, as it has long been held that the Sherman Act
was not intended to reach state action.
4 2
Thus, in the numerous antitrust-based attacks on state regulatory
programs and agency action, the proper scope of this "state action
doctrine" has often been the crucial issue. Though its boundaries
have never been clearly delineated, the doctrine has generally been
regarded as holding that the Sherman Act was not "intended to re-
strain state action or official action directed by a state."4 Whatever
the limits of the Parker defense, they were significantly eroded by the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Goldfarb,4 and have been nar-
rowed further by the decision this Term in Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Company,45 which also portends drastic changes in the legal and fac-
tual criteria relevant to a determination whether the defense is avail-
able. While it is far too early to discern with precision the ramifica-
tions of Goldfarb and Cantor, the dim outlines of the post-Cantor law
of state action are already evident.
A. State Action from Parker to Goldfarb
1. Parker v. Brown
The modern origins of the state action doctrine are usually traced
to the Supreme Court's 1943 decision in Parker v. Brown.46 In Parker,
a raisin producer brought suit to enjoin various state officials from
enforcing the California Agricultural Prorate Act." An appeal was
taken to the Supreme Court after the district court granted the plain-
10 E.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
E.g., Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 96
S.Ct. 1817 (1976).
" E.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
,3 Id. at 351.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
15 96 S.Ct. 3110 (1976).
3 17 U.S. 341 (1943). The Court's decision in Parker was based on Olsen v.
Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904), and Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 909 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895). It
was held in Olsen that a statute prohibiting unlicensed pilots from entering the pilo-
tage business did not violate the Sherman Act, while a state monopoly of the sale of
liquor was sustained in Lowenstein. Despite these earlier holdings, however, Parker is
viewed as the seminal decision.
7 317 U.S. at 344.
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tiff's request for an injunction, holding that a raisin marketing pro-
gram established under the Act unduly burdened interstate com-
merce."
The statute challenged in Parker was enacted to "conserve the
agricultural wealth" of California and to "prevent economic waste"
in the marketing of the state's agricultural products."5 Under the
statute, producers were authorized to petition for the establishment
of a prorate marketing plan governing the production of a particular
commodity within a defined production zone. Following a public
hearing, and an appropriate finding by the Agricultural Prorate Ad-
visory Commission under the Act, the Director of the Commission
was required to choose a program committee from nominees selected
by the qualified producers within the zone. Then, the program com-
mittee was required to formulate a proration marketing program for
review by the Commission." If approved by the Commission, and by
65% of the zone's producers owning 51% of the acreage devoted to
production of the regulated crop, a given program would be declared
instituted. Thus, although the administrative machinery was estab-
lished by the state, both the impetus and the final approval for a
program came from the producers to be regulated.
The Act provided criminal sanctions for failure to comply with an
instituted program.' Brown, a raisin producer, was subject to such a
program and claimed that, unless enjoined, the program would be
enforced against him and would prevent him from marketing his
raisin crop in interstate commerce.52 He challenged the program on
three grounds: first, as an unconstitutional burden on interstate com-
merce; second, as a violation of the Sherman Act; and finally, as in
conflict with the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of
1937. 5  The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and
upheld the California Act.
In reviewing the validity of the prorate program under the Sher-
man Act, the Supreme Court assumed that the program would vio-
late the antitrust laws if it resulted from concerted action by private
parties." Having made this assumption, the Court stated:
"' Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
. 317 U.S. at 346.
. Id. at 347. The Commission was empowered to approve the program with or
without modification.
Id. at 347.
52 Id. at 349.
Id. at 348-49.
5 Id. at 350.
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But it is plain that the prorate program here was never
intended to operate by force of individual agreement or combi-
nation. It derived its authority and its efficacy from the legisla-
tive command of the state and was not intended to operate or
become effective without that command. We find nothing in
the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which sug-
gests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or
agents from activities directed by its legislature ...
The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such,
and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action
or official action directed by a state. 5
In addition, the Court noted that the legislative history of the Sher-
man Act suggested no "purpose to restrain state action." 6
Discussing the scope of this state action immunity or exemption,
the Court observed that a state can neither authorize antitrust viola-
tions, nor declare the conduct of violators to be lawful.-7 Moreover,
the Court noted that there was no question in Parker of state
participation in a private agreement in restraint of trade. 8 Rather,
the California Act was viewed as a state command that created the
machinery for establishing prorate programs. The role of the regu-
lated producers under the Act was discussed as follows:
Although the organization of a prorate zone is proposed by
producers, and a prorate program, approved by the Commis-
sion, must also be approved by referendum of producers, it is
the state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the
program and which enforces it with penal sanctions, in the
execution of a governmental policy. The prerequisite approval
of the program upon referendum by a prescribed number of
producers is not the imposition by them of their will upon the
minority by force of agreement or combination which the Sher-
man Act prohibits. The state itself exercises its legislative au-
thority in making the regulation and in prescribing the condi-
tion of its application. The required vote on the referendum is
one of these conditions."
The Court concluded that the state, "as sovereign, imposed the re-
Id. at 350-51.
' Id. at 351, citing Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
317 U.S. at 351.
" Id. at 351-52, citing Union Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941).
5' 317 U.S. at 352.
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straint as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not
undertake to prohibit.
60
Although Parker held in general terms that the Sherman Act does
not restrain "state action," it left the term undefined. Nevertheless,
certain guidelines do emerge from a careful reading of the opinion.
First, the Court clearly did not intend that the state action exemption
should encompass all governmental activity, for it explicitly noted
that a state cannot authorize or ratify antitrust violations, and that
no question of state participation in such violations was presented. "
Second, while the defendants in Parker were state officials, the
Court's language plainly suggested that the producers affected by the
plan were also immune from antitrust liability. 2 And finally, the
Court did not conclude that any showing of regulatory necessity or
consistency with federal policy would also be required, once the fact
of state action had been established. 3 Notwithstanding these uncer-
tainties, it was to be thirty-two years before the Supreme Court, in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,6" again considered the proper scope
of the state action doctrine. 5 In the interim, however, the Parker
opinion was interpreted in a vast array of lower court decisions.
Id., citing Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1904) and Lowenstein v. Evans,
69 F. 908, 910 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895).
11 317 U.S. at 351-52.
42 For example, the Court held that state "agents" as well as officials were pro-
tected when acting pursuant to legislative direction. 317 U.S. at 350. Moreover, the
Court stated that "[t]he prerequisite approval of the program . . . by . . . producers
is not the imposition by them of their will upon the minority by force-of agreement or
combination which the Sherman Act prohibits." Id. at 352. Thus, the Parker opinion
indicated that the exemption would be available to private parties whose conduct
might be characterized as "state action."
13 It should be noted, however, that the Parker Court declined to hold that the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 246, conflicted with or
preempted the California statute. 317 U.S. at 358. This has been viewed in some later
decisions as evidence that consistency with federal policy is required. See, e.g., Hecht
v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972)
and text accompanying notes 99-104 infra.
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
"9 In a case bearing directly on the state action doctrine, the Supreme Court did
confirm its dictum in Parker that a state cannot authorize antitrust violations.
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). In Schwegmann,
which was decided prior to the passage of the McGuire Act, the question was presented
whether the Miller-Tydings Act preempted a Louisiana statute creating a cause of
action against retailers who failed to comply with fair trade programs. The challenged
statute did not require adherence to the program but did authorize private enforce-
ment of what were essentially price-fixing arrangements between manufacturers, dis-
tributors and retailers. Citing Parker v. Brown, the Court held that "when a state
compels retailers to follow a parallel price policy, it demands private conduct which
the Sherman Act prohibits." 341 U.S. at 389.
" See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th
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2. Parker in the Lower Courts
Because public policy has long favored the pervasive regulation of
natural monopolies, the Parker doctrine found fertile ground in a
series of cases involving public utilities.67 In the utilities field, of
course, there is generally no question but that the state has deter-
mined that a detailed regulatory scheme is preferable to competi-
tion. 8 Thus, the decisions have generally focused on the relationship
between the directives of the regulatory authority and the challenged
activities.
One such case, Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric &
Power Co., 9 represents the high water mark of the Parker v. Brown
defense. In Washington Gas Light, the plaintiff sued Virginia Electric
& Power Co. (Vepco), charging that the latter's pricing policies,
which encouraged developers to build "all electric" homes by waiving
installation charges for underground power lines, violated the anti-
trust laws. The district court enjoined the Vepco program," but the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the
regulatory power of the Virginia State Corporation Commission
brought Vepco's conduct within the state action exemption.' Signifi-
Cir. 1976); Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975); Jeffrey v. Southwest-
ern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975); State of New Mexico v. American Petrofina,
Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974); Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake and Potomac
Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973); Lamb Enterprises v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d
506 (6th Cir. 1972); Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011 (3d
Cir. 1971); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ladue Local
Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Developmental Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970); and text
accompanying notes 67-127 infra.
'" See, e.g., Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power
Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
"1 See, e.g., SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
519 (1970) ("ITihe electric power, gas, telephone, and railroad industries share cer-
tain economic characteristics which have historically made them prime targets for
regulation."). Thus, as to such industries, the inquiry undertaken in George R. Whit-
ten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 30 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 850 (1970), may be unnecessary. See text accompanying notes 86-89 infra.
" 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
7' 309 F. Supp. 1119 (E.D. Va. 1970).
Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir.
1971). The Fourth Circuit also held that the challenged activity did not constitute an
antitrust violation, sustaining Vepco's single-product defense to the plaintiff's tie-in
charge. For a critical discussion of this second ground for the Fourth Circuit's decision,
see Wheeler, Some Observations on Tie-Ins, the Single-Product Defense, Exclusive
Dealing and Regulated Industries, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1557 (1972); Comment, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 670 (1972).
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cantly, the Parker defense was held to apply even though Vepco's
tariffs had not been investigated or approved by the State Corpora-
tion Commission, on the theory that the Commission's power coupled
with its silence implied approval. 72 Thus, unexercised regulatory ju-
risdiction was found to constitute state action rendering the antitrust
laws inapplicable. Washington Gas Light has been sharply criticized
by those unsympathetic to the state action defense,73 and is generally
recognized as "[t]he case which seems to go farthest in applying the
Parker doctrine."'"
While declining to go as far as Washington Gas Light, other courts
have generally agreed that the implementation of public utility rate
structures is a peculiarly sovereign function, clearly constituting state
action within the meaning of Parker v. Brown. For example, in Gas
Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co.,7" a case involving facts and issues
similar to those raised in Washington Gas Light, the Fifth Circuit
specifically refused to extend the Parker exclusion "to the point of its
extension in Washington Gas Light. "I' The state action defense was
sustained in Georgia Power, however, because the state's regulatory
powers had actually been exercised. The Court stated:
Our view is that the Parker exclusion applies to the rates and
practices of public utilities enjoying monopoly status under
state policy when their rates and practices are subjected to
meaningful regulation and supervision by the state to the end
that they are the result of the considered judgment of the state
regulatory authority.
7
Thus, prior to Cantor, Georgia Power and other lower court decisions
had established relatively clearly that adherence by a public utility
to the rules and regulations of its operative tariff was a "classic exam-
ple" of the sort of conduct exempted from antitrust attack by Parker
v. Brown.7"
72 438 F.2d at 252.
'3 See, e.g., Kintner and Kaufman, The State Action Antitrust Immunity
Defense, 23 AM. U. L. REv. 527, 530-33 (1974).
" Norman's On the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011, 1018 (3d Cir.
1971). See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972).
75 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
7, 440 F.2d at 1140.
"Id.
'A Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th Cir. 1975). Accord, e.g.,
Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973);
Lamb Enterprises v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1972); Alabama Power
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If the applicability of Parker v. Brown in the public utility context
was thought to be relatively clear,79 there developed a generally ac-
knowledged confusion regarding its applicability in the absence of a
pervasive regulatory scheme of the sort encountered in the utility
cases."' For example, in George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc.,81 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that
the adoption by a public body of a contractor's specifications for
swimming pools did not suffice to confer antitrust immunity on the
contractor under the doctrine of Parker v. Brown.
Similarly, the court declined to extend the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trines to the contractor's efforts to sell swimming pool gutter assem-
blies to certain public bodies acting under competitive bidding proce-
dures. Whitten had charged that Paddock's selling efforts violated
the antitrust laws because it conspired to require the use of its own
specifications in the public swimming pool industry, with the intent
to exclude Whitten.8 3 The district court granted summary judgment
for Paddock on Noerr-Pennington grounds.84 On appeal, the First
Co. v. Alabama Electric Cooperative, Inc., 394 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1000 (1968).
11 See cases cited in note 78, supra. It is probably accurate to state that Georgia
Power suggests the areas within which the conduct of public utilities was thought to
be clearly protected by the state action doctrine. As subsequent judicial reaction to
the opinion evidenced, Washington Gas Light, on the other hand, dealt with conduct
not clearly within this area of certainty.
' It would be impracticable, of course, to characterize every regulatory scheme
as consistent or inconsistent with general principles of utility regulation. It is generally
accepted, however, that utility-type regulation is used primarily to control natural
monopolies. See, e.g., R. WARREN, ANTITRUST IN THEORY AND PRACTIcE 5 (1975). State
economic regulation, which ranges from the comprehensive to the piecemeal, also
affects a wide variety of businesses that cannot be characterized as natural monopolies.
As to some of these businesses, the inefficacy of competition is not always readily
apparent, and the application of Parker v. Brown in such situations has generated
confusion and criticism. See, e.g., Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law v. Anticompetitive
State Regulation, 39 ANTITRUST L. J. 950 (1970).
11 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970).
'2 This doctrine, which is based on United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965) and Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961), holds that joint efforts to influence public officials in the passage of
laws are beyond the scope of the antitrust laws. Antitrust immunity does not result,
however, if such efforts are a mere sham, designed to camouflage anticompetitive
conduct. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
See Oppenheim, Antitrust Immunity for Joint Efforts to Influence Adjudication before
Administrative Agencies and Courts, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 209 (1972).
424 F.2d at 27.
" See note 82 supra. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which protects private en-
deavors designed to influence governmental action, is distinct from the doctrine of
Parker v. Brown, which immunizes private conduct required by the state.
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Circuit reversed. Addressing the question whether the adoption of
Paddock's specifications by public bodies was sufficient to bring de-
fendants within the state action exemption, the court noted that the
government action was taken in a proprietary capacity, and that the
initial responsibility for recommending specifications was delegated
to a hired professional, who was in turn subjected to often fraudulent
and threatening sales tactics.m The court determined that Parker v.
Brown precluded "the facile conclusion that action by any public
official automatically confers exemption," and held that
. . .valid government action confers antitrust immunity only
when government determines that competition is not the
summum bonum in a particular field and deliberately at-
tempts to provide an alternate form of public regulation."
Thus, the court viewed Parker as applicable only where govern-
ment has acted in the public interest to supplant competition with
regulation, as where state agencies regulate utilities and other mo-
nopolies. 7 A second type of regulation, the court noted, occurs when
underlying state policy is "neutral or silent with respect to restraints
of trade."" In such cases there is no conflict between regulatory ac-
tion and the benefits of competition, and there is consequently no
reason to apply the state action exemption. Finally, there are cases
in which state policy is neither anticompetitive nor neutral, but relies
on the mechanisms of a competitive market. The court viewed laws
requiring competitive bidding as falling into this category, and con-
cluded that to confer immunity on Paddock would undermine the
competitive bidding process. 9
Similarly, in Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum
Co. of America,"0 the Fifth Circuit held that neither the Parker de-
424 F.2d at 29.
Id. at 30. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
'T See text accompanying note 68 supra.
424 F.2d at 31.
Id. Paddock's Noerr-Pennington defense was rejected on the theory that, while
Paddock was free to persuade the legislature to change its competitive bidding policy,
its dealings with officials administering that policy should be subject to the same
limitations as its dealings with private consumers. Thus, "the immunity for efforts to
influence public officials in the enforcement of laws does not extend to efforts to sell
products to public officials acting under competitive bidding statutes." Id. at 33. Of
course, to the extent that the court relied on Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942), its decision may now be suspect. See Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.
v. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
- 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
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fense nor the Noerr-Pennington doctrine9 justified antitrust immun-
ity for Texas gas producers alleged to have filed false nomination
forecasts with the Texas Railroad Commission to reduce the plain-
tiffs' allowed production level.2 While the Court acknowledged that
the state had acted to reduce the "production allowable" assigned to
plaintiffs, it cautioned that the presence of state participation "only
begins the analysis, for it is not every governmental act that points a
path to an antitrust shelter."9 Rather, the court concluded that the
crucial inquiry was "whether the real decision makers were public
officials or private businessmen."'
Analyzing the facts before it in Woods Exploration, the court
noted that the Commission's order relied on false facts adduced by
the defendant. Moreover, the Commission had no meaningful oppor-
tunity to verify the facts, since the relevant information was within
the exclusive control of the defendants. Recognizing that the Com-
mission had no choice but to accept the proffered information at face
value, the court stated:
Hence, defendants' conduct here can in no way be said to have
become merged with the action of the state since the Commis-
sion neither was the real decision maker nor would have in-
tended its order to be based on false facts. Indeed, plaintiffs'
basic claim is that the applicable production allowable for-
mula which the state would have intended to utilize was sub-
verted to the injury of plaintiffs by defendants' filing of false
nomination forecasts. The situation is analogous to the filing
of fraudulent statements with the Patent Office, which has
been held to be evidence of an antitrust violation.
In addition to rejecting the Parker and Noerr-Pennington defenses,
the court refused to hold that "because of extensive regulation the oil
and gas industry is not susceptible to the strictures of the antitrust
laws."98 Rather, the court noted that immunity from the antitrust
See note 82 supra.
92 438 F.2d at 1289.
Id. at 1294, distinguishing Okefenokee Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Florida
Power & Light Co., 214 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1954).
11 438 F.2d at 1295, quoting George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders,
Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 33 n.8 (lst Cir. 1970). This inquiry was also relevant to the Supreme
Court in Cantor. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3118-19 (1976), and
text accompanying notes 166-74, 228-29, 258-67, and 280 infra.
" 438 F.2d at 1295.
" Id. at 1302.
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laws is not lightly to be implied,97 and declared it "incumbent upon
this court to render both state regulatory and federal antitrust goals
complementary rather than mutually exclusive."98
The Woods Exploration court was not alone in its suggestion,
which seems to cut across certain basic tenets of federalism,99 that the
principles established in cases involving conflicts between the anti-
trust laws and other federal statutes should also be used to reconcile
state regulatory schemes with federal antitrust policy. For example,
in Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc.,' the court stated that
• . . the proper inquiry would seem to be to what extent Con-
gress has knowingly adopted a policy contrary to or inconsist-
ent with the previously established antitrust laws, or, where
state action is concerned . . ., the inquiry should be to what
extent is the state action permissible as not contravening the
federal antitrust laws, which in our federal system constitute
overriding legislation under the federal commerce power." "
Although Hecht involved an antitrust challenge to certain restrictive
provisions in a lease between Pro-Football and the District of Colum-
bia Armory Board, a federally created governmental entity, the par-
ties relied on Parker and its progeny, and the court acknowledged the
similarity between the Armory Board and a state governmental
agency.' °2 The Hecht opinion plainly suggests that federal courts
should review the policies underlying state statutes before determin-
ing whether the Parker exemption is available. 03 Indeed, in language
suggestive of a straightforward preemption analysis, the court
characterized the "overall question" as "to what extent, if any, the
Congress intended to permit action not consistent with the antitrust
laws." 04
'7 Id., citing United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967).
" Id. This statement, of course, also foreshadowed Cantor. See Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3119-20 (1976) and text accompanying notes 175-82, 230-
40, 268-70, 277-79 infra.
" See Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1976).
"' 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
10! 444 F.2d at 935.
,12 Id. at 936.
'13 Id. at 935. Moreover, the court indicated that such review is not inconsistent
with Parker: "Thus, Parker v. Brown involves not just state governmental action; it
involves regulatory action in the state's capacity as sovereign, and it involves sovereign
state regulatory action which is consistent with federal national policy, i.e., the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act, enunciated by the National Congress, which is also the
source of federal antitrust policy." Id. at 937.
0I Id. at 938.
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In addition to making it more difficult for private parties to avail
themselves of the Parker defense, the Hecht court suggested that,
because the antitrust laws might operate even in the presence of state
action, the conduct of governmental entities might be subject to anti-
trust attack at least in some circumstances."5 The court reasoned
that Congress empowered the Armory Board to maintain and operate
Kennedy Stadium, but did not authorize it to manage the only pro-
fessional football team to be allowed to play in the Stadium. Thus,
the Board went beyond its mandate, the court seems to say, when it
entered into a contract that effectively guaranteed a monopoly to
Pro-Football's Washington Redskins, and would not be exempted
from antitrust liability.' This conclusion is entirely consistent with
the holding in Goldfarb that the state action doctrine applies only to
conduct "required by the State acting as sovereign,"'0 7 and post-
Goldfarb decisions indicate that the potential liability of governmen-
tal entities will be analyzed accordingly.0 8
On the eve of the Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar,"9 then, judicial analysis of the state action doctrine had
delineated three broad areas of inquiry. The first, typified by deci-
sions like Washington Gas Light"' and Georgia Power Co."' was a
definitional inquiry, which sought to determine what degree of state
involvement was required to warrant a finding of "state action." The
second area of inquiry centered on the proposition, evident in deci-
sions like Hecht, 2 Woods Exploration,"' and George R. Whitten,"'
105 Id. at 938-40. Cf. E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority,
362 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1966) (suggesting that the governmental-proprietary distinc-
tion may be significant to a determination whether Parker v. Brown applies); Ladue
Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Developmental Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970).
"0 444 F.2d at 939-40.
'0 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975).
' See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir.
1976); Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975). State of New Mexico v.
American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974) is contra, but was decided prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb.
l 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir.
1971).
UI Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1063 (1972).
112 Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972).
"I Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
"' George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st
Cir. 1970).
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that a substantive dimension, similar to that encountered in cases
involving federal statutes that conflict with the antitrust laws,"
'5
should be added to the definitional analysis.
Finally, decisions like Hecht v. Pro-Football"' raised the question
whether the immunity afforded governmental entities under the
Parker doctrine is greater than that available to private parties. The
Goldfarb decision seemed to clarify some of the definitional uncer-
tainties, and made it apparent that state agencies enjoyed no blanket
immunity from antitrust liability. But it did not indicate whether
further inquiry is required, once the presence of "state action" has
been established.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, "7 the plaintiff sued the Fairfax
County Bar Association and the Virginia State Bar, claiming that the
promulgation of a lawyers' minimum fee schedule by the Assocation
violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. The trial court held that the conduct
of the State Bar was state action exempt from antitrust challenge
under the doctrine of Parker v. Brown,"' and the Fourth Circuit
affirmed."' The activities of the Fairfax County Bar Association, on
the other hand, were found by the Fourth Circuit to be without the
scope of the state action exemption.'12
The Supreme Court, without specifying what a'full Parker v.
Brown analysis would entail, held that the Fairfax County Bar Asso-
ciation's state action defense never got past the threshold inquiry of
whether the alleged anticompetitive activity was "required by the
State acting as sovereign. ' ' ' 2' Neither approving mention of minimum
fee schedules in ethical codes promulgated by the Supreme Court of
Virginia nor their apparent approval by the State Bar was sufficient
to confer immunity: "It is not enough that. . . anticompetitive con-
duct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, anticompetitive activities
must be compelled by direction of the State acting as sovereign.'
' 22
113 E.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
"I Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972).
,, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
,' 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973).
"' 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974). The Fourth Circuit held that the State Bar met three
requirements considered in Parker: its activity was for the benefit of the public, took
place pursuant to legislative command, and was subject to active supervision by the
State. Id. at 4-12.
'2 Id. at 12-13.
"1' 421 U.S. at 790.
I' Id. at 791.
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Thus, the Supreme Court made it fairly clear that the definition of
"state action" does not extend to passive approval of anticompetitive
conduct, rejecting the rationale previously approved by lower court
decisions like Washington Gas Light. 3
In addition to ruling that the County Bar could not avail itself of
the state action defense, the Supreme Court denied the exemption to
the Virginia State Bar. The Court reasoned that the State Bar's
status as a "state agency for some limited purposes does not create
an antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices
for the benefit of its members."'' 4 Thus, the Supreme Court viewed
the state agency as having joined voluntarily in what otherwise would
have been wholly private anticompetitive conduct. By holding the
State Bar liable, the Supreme Court breathed new life into the Parker
opinion's "exception" for state participation in activity repugnant to
the antitrust laws.'2
In the wake of Goldfarb, it became evident from lower court deci-
sions that the boundaries of the state action exemption were shifting
substantially on several fronts. As indicated above, Goldfarb itself
diminished the scope of the exemption from a definitional stand-
point, and made it clear that claims of immunity by governmental
entities would be subject to more rigorous judicial scrutiny. These
developments, in turn, sparked a more general assault on the Parker
v. Brown defense. 25 Before the emerging trends could take hold, how-
ever, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Cantor v. De-
troit Edison Company.
2 7
B. The Supreme Court's Decision in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Com-
pany
The Cantor litigation involved an antitrust challenge to the
Detroit Edison Company's lamp supply program. The Company sup-
2 Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir.
1971).
12, 421 U.S. at 791 (footnote omitted).
"2 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943). For a more thorough discussion
of the Goldfarb Court's holding on state action, see Shenefield, Annual Survey of
Antitrust Developments 1974-75, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 259, 289-93 (1976).
126 See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th
Cir. 1976); Litton Systems, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 539 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.
1976); Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975).
127 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
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plied its residential subscribers with light bulbs for use in their
homes, and replaced the bulbs without charge when they burned out.
Detroit Edison had included the program in its proposed tariff, and
the program became a mandatory service when the tariff was adopted
by order of the Michigan Public Service Commission (PSC). Thus,
the program was a part of Detroit Edison's approved rate structure,
and could not be abandoned unilaterally.'1
Cantor, who owned a drugstore, filed suit, charging that the lamp
supply program had damaged him in his business by impairing his
ability to sell light bulbs. Specifically, Cantor claimed that in pursu-
ing the program Detroit Edison violated § 2 of the Sherman Act12 1 and
§ 3 of the Clayton Act.'13 The plaintff argued that Detroit Edison had
instituted the plan for the purpose of increasing electrical consump-
tion, and that "at best the Michigan Public Service Commission has
rubber-stamped this plan."' 31 In support of this argument, the plain-
tiff pointed out that the PSC neither held hearings on the program
nor promulgated any regulations governing its administrative de-
tails.
3 2
Detroit Edison moved for summary judgment on the ground that
its business activities fell within the state action exemption to the
antitrust laws because they were pervasively regulated by the Michi-
gan Public Service Commission. The Company noted that the Com-
mission had "plenary power" to regulate utilities under Michigan
law, and that its order requiring the Company to provide free light
bulbs to subscribers was well within the Commission's power.' Thus,
the question was whether conduct required by Detroit Edison's ap-
proved rate tariff constituted "state activity . . .shielded from
claimed antitrust violation."'34
The district court held that the facts before it fell squarely within
the exemption provided by the state action doctrine, and granted the
Company's motion for summary judgment. 31 On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision without opinion. 3 The
121 Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 392 F. Supp. 1110, 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd,
513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975) reu'd, 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
'" 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
' 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).




" Id. at 1112.
'' Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 3110
(1976).
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Supreme Court then granted certiorari,3 7 indicating that for the sec-
ond time in as many years it would examine the proper scope of the
Parker v. Brown defense.
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Mr. Justice Stevens declared
in the first paragraph of his lengthy opinion that the Court "must
decide whether the Parker rationale immunizes private action which
has been approved by a State and which must be continued while the
state approval remains effective."' 38 Thus, as it had done more than
three decades before in Parker v. Brown, 3' the Court assumed that,
without the approval of the Michigan Public Service Commission,
Detroit Edison's conduct would violate the antitrust laws.
4 0
The Supreme Court's opinion was divided into four parts. In Parts
I and III, which expressed the views of five members of the Court, 4'
Mr. Justice Stevens described Detroit Edison's lamp supply program,
and found that neither its approval by the Public Service Commis-
sion nor the fact that it could not be terminated without PSC consent
immunized the Company from antitrust liability. A plurality of the
Court, 4 1 in Part II of the opinion, distinguished Parker v. Brown on
the novel ground that the Parker concept of state action does not
encompass private conduct, but only the conduct of state officials.'
Moreover, in Part IV, the same plurality dealt summarily with sev-
eral other arguments, including concern by regulated industries over
massive treble damage exposure, and the impact of the Cantor deci-
sion on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.' 4
1. The Majority Opinion: Part I
At the outset, Mr. Justice Stevens described Detroit Edison's
lamp supply program,' and enumerated several facts, unmentioned
137 423 U.S. 821 (1975).
" Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3112 (1976).
317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
1 96 S. Ct. at 3113.
'' Joining in these parts of Mr. Justice Stevens' opinion were the Chief Justice
and Justices Brennan, White and Marshall.
" The plurality consisted of Mr. Justice Stevens, who was joined by Justices
Brennan, White and Marshall.
", 96 S. Ct. at 3117.
' Id. at 3121-23.
,, The opinion explained that,
Under respondent's practice, new residential customers are pro-
vided with bulbs in 'such quantities as may be needed' for all of their
permanent fixtures; thereafter, respondent replaces residential cus-
tomers' burned out light bulbs in proportion to their estimated use of
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in the trial court's opinion, that were significant to the Supreme
Court's findings. The Court noted first that, by requiring that the
program be implemented, the Michigan Public Service Commission
had approved a marketing practice that had a "substantial impact
on the otherwise unregulated business of distributing electric light
bulbs."'46 In this connection, as the sole supplier of electricity in
southeastern Michigan, Detroit Edison supplied consumers with al-
most 50% of the standard size light bulbs required most often for
home use."' Emphasizing that the distribution of electric light bulbs
in Michigan was unregulated, the Court noted specifically that the
statute creating the Public Service Commission contains "no direct
reference to light bulbs," and that no other Michigan statute author-
ized regulation of the light bulb business. 4 '
Second, the Court observed that neither the PSC nor the Michi-
gan legislature had ever investigated the desirability of the program
from a regulatory standpoint, or evaluated its potential impact on
competition in the light bulb market."' Indeed, while Detroit Edi-
son's policy of providing light bulbs to its customers without charge
predated the regulation of electric utilities by the State of Michi-
gan,' 0 the other utilities regulated by the PSC had no such pro-
grams.' 5' This led the Court to conclude that PSC approval of Detroit
Edison's program did not further any statewide policy regarding the
distribution of light bulbs. Thus, the Court inferred "that the State's
policy is neutral on the question whether a utility should, or should
not, have such a program."
' 52
Third, the Court recognized that Detroit Edison could not aban-
don the lamp supply program without violating state law:
electricity for lighting. The customer incurs no direct charge for such
bulbs at the time they are furnished to him, but normally turns in any
burned out bulbs to obtain a new supply.
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3115 n.5 (1976).
"' Id. at 3112.
"' Id. at 3113. The utility did not distribute fluorescent lights or high intensity
lamps; if bulbs in those categories were included, Detroit Edison's share of the south-
eastern Michigan light bulb market would have been only 23%. 96 S. Ct. at 3113 n.4.
"I Id. at 3114.
14 Id.
' Id. at 3113. The historical purpose of the light bulb program, according to
Detroit Edison, was to increase the consumption of electricity. The Company's records
reflected no direct profit from the program, and the Company claimed that its policy
saved consumers roughly $3 million per year. Not surprisingly, Cantor argued that,
whatever the program's purpose, its effect was "to foreclose competition in a substan-
tial segment of the light bulb market." Id. at 3114 (footnote omitted).
" Id. at 3114.
152 Id.
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Although there is no statute, Commission rule, or policy
which would prevent respondent from abandoning the pro-
gram merely by filing a new tariff providing for a proper ad-
justment in its rates, it is nevertheless apparent that while the
existing tariff remains in effect, respondent may not abandon
the program without violating a Commission order, and there-
fore without violating state law. It has, therefore, both been
permitted by the Commission to carry out the program, and
also is required to continue to do so until an appropriate filing
has been made and has received the approval of the
Commission.'53
Finally, Mr. Justice Stevens noted that no public official was a party
to the litigation and that Cantor made no claim that any representa-
tive or agent of the state had violated the antitrust laws.5 4
2. The Plurality Opinion: Part II
In Part II of the Court's opinion, which represented the views of a
four-man plurality,'55 Mr. Justice Stevens reviewed the concept of
state action as set forth in Parker v. Brown. " To Mr. Justice Stevens,
what might be termed the "legislative history" of Parker illuminated
the proper scope of the state action exemption.'57 The Court noted
that it had heard oral argument on the Commerce Clause issue in
Parker v. Brown in early 1942, and that the case was later set for
reargument on the Sherman Act issue presumably because the Court
had held, in Georgia v. Evans,' that a state is a "person" entitled
to sue for treble damages under the antitrust laws. The Court in
Parker asked that, on reargument, the parties discuss the question
whether the California statute was invalidated by the Sherman
Act.'59
Observing that the defendants in Parker were all state officials,
Mr. Justice Stevens explained that, in an amicus curiae brief filed
on behalf of the United States, the Solicitor General declined to argue
that the State of California or the individual defendants in Parker
153 Id.
"' Id.
,55 Part II of Mr. Justice Stevens' opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, White
and Marshall.
Is 317 U.S. 341 (1943). A brief synopsis of the Parker decision, and its factual
background, is set forth in the text accompanying notes 46-66 supra.
, 96 S. Ct. at 3114-15.
'' 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
' ' 96 S. Ct. at 3115.
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had violated the antitrust laws.' 0 The Cantor opinion went on to note
that, in the same brief, the Solicitor General "drew an important
distinction between economic action taken by the State itself and
private action taken pursuant to a state statute permitting or requir-
ing individuals to engage in conduct prohibited by the Sherman
Act."'"' Having described the distinction drawn by the Solicitor Gen-
eral, Mr. Justice Stevens concluded that because the Parker holding
involved a challenge to conduct taken by state officials, the concept
of state action embodied in the Parker opinion does not encompass
"private action taken under color of state law."'6 2 As the defendant
in Cantor was a private utility, and the conduct of the State of Michi-
gan or its officials was not questioned, a plurality of the Court thus
held that Parker was not controlling." 3
3. The Majority Opinion: Part HTT
Because a majority of the Court did not agree with Mr. Justice
Stevens' holding that the Parker v. Brown defense can never shield
private conduct from antitrust liability. Part II of the Cantor opinion
left unanswered the question whether "private conduct required by
state law is exempt from the Sherman Act.""' Addressing this ques-
tion in Part IIT of its opinion, the Court recognized that "[t]wo quite
different reasons might support such a rule."" 5
First, if a private citizen has done nothing more than obey the
command of his state sovereign, it would be unjust to conclude
that he has thereby offended federal law. Second, if the State
is already regulating an area of the economy, it is arguable that
Congress did not intend to superimpose the antitrust laws as
an additional, and perhaps conflicting, regulatory
mechanism."'
As to the first rationale for a state action exemption, the Court
assumed for the purposes of argument that it would be improper ever
to impose antitrust liability on "a party who had done nothing more
than obey a state command.""' 7 But the Court did not view this







"57 Id. at 3118.
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assumption as decisive in the Cantor case and, indeed, remarked that
it would probably not be dispositive in any actual case. This is so,
the Court explained, because cases like Cantor typically involve "a
blend of private and public decisionmaking."'' l In this connection,
the Court referred to several cases which held that private conduct
is not immune from antitrust scrutiny merely because the state has
participated in or commanded the conduct.169 The Court found it
significant that, in each of these cases,
. . . notwithstanding the state participation in the decision,
the private party exercised sufficient freedom of choice to ena-
ble the Court to conclude that he should be held responsible
for the consequences of his decision. 7 '
Thus, while the Court did recognize an immunity from liability for
parties who have "done nothing more than obey a state command,'
7'
its language plainly suggests that this immunity is very narrow.
Turning to an analysis of Detroit Edison's conduct under the
"unfairness" standard, the Court acknowledged that the Company's
lamp exchange program was required by its rate schedule and could
not be abandoned without the approval of the Michigan Public Serv-
ice Commission.' Nevertheless, the Court viewed the decision to
have such a program as one made by Detroit Edison, and not by the
Commission. 73 On this basis, the Court decided that
"' Id. (footnote omitted). The Court even observed that "there was significant
private participation in the formulation and effectuation of the proration program"
challenged in Parker v. Brown. 96 S. Ct. at 3118 n.25.
"I Id. at 3118, citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975);
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Schweg-
mann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341, 351-52 (1943); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). The Court
noted that "[iun each of these cases the initiation and enforcement of the program
under attack involved a mixture of private and public decisionmaking." 96 S. Ct. at
3118 & nn. 25-30.
'7o Id. at 3118.
'7' Id. (emphasis added).
172 Id.
"1 Id. Interestingly, the Court analogized Detroit Edison's conduct to that of the
defendant in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). In that case,
the Court held that Metropolitan Edison's decision to terminate service to one of its
customers did not constitute state action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
in Jackson described its reasoning as follows:
The nature of governmental regulation of private utilities is such that
a utility may frequently be required by the state regulatory scheme
to obtain approval for practices a business regulated in less detail
would be free to institute without any approval from a regulatory
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[tihere is nothing unjust in a conclusion that respondent's
participation in the decision is sufficiently significant to re-
quire that its conduct implementing the decision, like compa-
rable conduct by unregulated businesses, conform to
applicable federal law.' 4
After determining that no claim of unfairness would warrant
immunizing Detroit Edison's conduct from the antitrust laws, the
Court addressed the question "whether Congress intended to super-
impose antitrust standards on conduct already being regulated under
a different standard."'7 5 The Company argued that the public interest
standard employed in the pervasive regulation of electric utilities and
other natural monopolies is fundamentally inconsistent with the
competitive standard imposed by the antitrust laws. The Court re-
jected this contention, reasoning that even if the antitrust laws were
not intended to apply to "areas of the economy primarily regulated
by a State, that . . . would not foreclose the enforcement of the
antitrust laws in an essentially unregulated area such as the market
for electric light bulbs."'7 6 Thus, while recognizing that some regula-
tory schemes are designed to prevent unrestrained competition,'" Mr.
body. Approval by a state utility commission of such a request from
a regulated utility, where the Commission has not put its own weight
on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it, does not transmute
a practice initiated by the utility and approved by the Commission
into 'state action.' At most, the Commission's failure to overturn this
practice amounted to no more than a determination that a Pennsyl-
vania utility was authorized to employ such a practice if it so desired.
Respondent's exercise of the choice allowed by state law where the
initiative comes from it and not from the State, does not make its
actions in doing so 'state action' for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974) (footnote omitted), quoted in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
96 S. Ct. 3110, 3118-19 n.31 (1976). The analogy was rejected by the dissent. Id. at 3133
n.10.
'" 96 S. Ct. at 3119 (footnote omitted). In a footnote to this statement, the Court
declared that its conclusion is not "even arguably inconsistent" with the underlying
rationale of Parker v. Brown, explaining that, in Parker, "California required every
raisin producer in the State to comply with the Proration Program, whereas Michigan
has never required any utility to adopt a lamp exchange program." Id. at 3119 n.32.
Actually, the proration programs challenged in Parker were adopted only at the in-
stance of raisin producers, just as the lamp supply program was adopted at the in-
stance of Detroit Edison.
',5 96 S. Ct. at 3119.
I7' !d.
7 The Court acknowledged that the agricultural marketing program challenged
in Parker v. Brown was such a scheme. 96 S. Ct. at 3119.
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Justice Stevens wrote that "[t]here is no logical inconsistency be-
tween requiring [a public utility] to meet regulatory criteria insofar
as it is exercising its natural monopoly powers and also to comply
with antitrust standards to the extent that it engages in business




The Court then proceeded to delineate the proper standards for
determining whether private conduct required by a state is exempt
from antitrust scrutiny. Mr. Justice Stevens made it clear that the
"mere possibility of conflict" between the regulatory policy embodied
in a state statute, on the one hand, and the policy underlying the
federal antitrust laws on the other, does not justify an exemption.79
Rather, the Court held that the standards for ascertaining the exist-
ence and scope of the exemption must be at least as strict as those
applied in cases involving conflicts between the antitrust laws and
federal regulatory statutes.' 0 In those cases, an exemption was im-
plied only when required to make the regulatory act work, and then
only to the minimum extent necessary.'' Under this standard, the
Court refused to imply any antitrust exemption for Detroit Edison's
lamp supply program. Consistent with this conclusion, the Court
expressed its view that Michigan's regulatory scheme did not conflict
with the antitrust laws, and that a finding that the light bulb ex-
change program violated the antitrust laws would not impair the
state's interest in regulating the distribution of electricity.'
'T' Id. (footnote omitted).
'7' Id. at 3120. This was obvious, the Court found, since "Congress could hardly
have intended state regulatory agencies to have broader power than federal agencies
to exempt private conduct from the antitrust laws." Id. (footnote omitted).
Ig, Id.
' Id. (footnote omitted). Significantly, the cases relied on by the Court in this
portion of its opinion dealt with conflicts between the antitrust laws and federal regula-
tory schemes. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694,
719-20 (1975) ("Implied antitrust immunity is not favored, and can be justified only
by a convincing showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the regula-
tory system."); Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 692-93 (1975) (mere
regulatory jurisdiction over challenged activities does not confer immunity; conduct
required by the regulatory entity must be necessary to make the regulatory scheme
work); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 391 (1973) (electric utility
subjected to federal antitrust laws despite possible conflict between federal regulatory
policy and federal antitrust policy).
"1 96 S. Ct. at 3120. The Court was careful to note that its refusal to imply an
exemption did not suggest that Detroit Edison's conduct violated the antitrust laws.
Id. at 3121 n.38.
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4. The Plurality Opinion: Part IV
Part IV of Mr. Justice Stevens' opinion, which like Part II was
joined in by only three other Justices,'1 dealt with the concerns
voiced by other members of the Court that the holding in Cantor
would precipitate massive treble damage claims against regulated
firms, for actions taken in good faith to comply with regulatory re-
quirements."4 This concern over treble damage liability, the Court
acknowledged, would be relevant in either of two situations:
If the hazard of violating the antitrust laws were enhanced by
the fact of regulation, or if a regulated company had engaged
in anticompetitive conduct in reliance on a justified under-
standing that such conduct was immune from the antitrust
laws, a concern with the punitive aspects of the treble damage
remedy would be appropriate.""
The Court concluded that neither of these circumstances was present
in the Cantor case.
First, the Court observed simply that regulatory approval of a
company's proposed tariff does not increase the likelihood that imple-
mentation of the programs contained in the tariff will violate the
antitrust laws. The Court then devoted greater attention to the ques-
tion of reliance, which was of far greater concern to the five Justices
who declined to join in the plurality opinion. On this point, Mr.
Justice Stevens wrote that Detroit Edison could not "fairly claim that
it was led to believe that its conduct was exempt from the federal
antitrust laws," since "[t]his Court has never sustained a claim that
otherwise unlawful private conduct is exempt from the antitrust laws
because it was permitted or required by state law."'' The Court's
prior holding in Parker was dismissed as a narrow one concerned only
with the conduct of state officials.'87
I" Mr. Justice Stevens' opinion in Part IV was joined by Justices Brennan, White
and Marshall.
I" Mr. Justice Stevens referred to this charge as "an oft-repeated criticism of the
inevitably imprecise language of the Sherman Act and of the consequent difficulty in
predicting with certainty its application to various specific fact situations." 96 S. Ct.
at 3121 (footnote omitted). He added that "[tihe far-reaching value of this basic part
of our law, however, has enabled it to withstand such criticism in the past." Id.
(footnote omitted).
"7 Id. at 3121.
Id.
"7 Regarding Parker, the plurality stated:
[The narrow holding in Parker concerned only the legality of
the conduct of the state officials charged by law with the responsibility
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In addition, the Court stated that Detroit Edison could not justifi-
ably rely upon Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., I'l in which the Court had held that no antitrust
violation can be predicated on an attempt to influence the passage
or enforcement of legislation.'89 According to Mr. Justice Stevens,
nothing in the Noerr opinion suggested that regulatory approval of a
tariff justifies conferring antitrust immunity on conduct proposed by
that tariff.9 0 Referring to the Noerr Court's reliance on Parker v.
Brown, 9' the Court reiterated the Parker dictum that a state cannot
authorize antitrust violations, and concluded that the reference to
Parker in the Noerr opinion "sheds no light on the significance of
state action which amounts to little more than approval of a private
proposal."'' Thus, the plurality viewed its holding as a refusal to
allow state agencies to do precisely what Parker forbade, namely, to
grant immunity to conduct violative of the antitrust laws merely by
directing private parties to engage in such conduct.
9 3
At the close of its opinion, the Court observed that a simple rule,
according immunity to private companies acting in compliance with
state regulatory orders, would be supported by the "wholesome inter-
est in simplicity in the regulation of a complex economy.""' But this
interest in simplicity was held to be outweighed by the strong federal
interests underlying the antitrust laws, and by the concomitant inter-
est in preventing the creation of antitrust immunities unrelated ei-
ther to federal policy or to "necessary significant" state interests.'
for administering California's program. What sort of charge might
have been made against the various private persons who engaged in a
variety of different activities implementing that program is unknown
and unknowable because no such charges were made. Even if the state
program had been held unlawful, such a holding would not necessarily
have supported a claim that private individuals who had merely con-
formed their conduct to an invalid program has thereby violated the
Sherman Act. Unless and until a court answered that question, there
would be no occasion to consider an affirmative defense of immunity
or exemption.
Id. at 3122. (footnote omitted). But see text accompanying notes 61-66 supra.
365 U.S. 127 (1961).
'" Id. at 135-36.
"' 96 S. Ct. at 3122.
I' ld. at 3122 n.44, quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1961).
192 96 S. Ct. at 3122-23.




The Court concluded that state action issues, like so many other
issues arising in the antitrust field, should be adjudicated on a case-
by-case basis.
Three separate opinions, representing the views of five Justices,
were filed in the Cantor case. The Chief Justice filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment and in all except Parts II and IV of the
Court's opinion."' Also filing a concurring opinion was Mr. Justice
Blackmun who agreed with the judgment and the holding that the
sanction or requirement of anticompetitive conduct by state law does
not of itself confer an antitrust exemption on such conduct, but whose
reasoning differed significantly from that of the plurality.' 7 Finally,
Mr. Justice Stewart authored the vigorous dissent, which was joined
in by Justices Powell and Rehnquist."'
5. The Concurring Opinions
While agreeing with the Court's judgment, Chief Justice Burger
declined to join in its narrow reading of Parker v. Brown, on the
ground that in previous decisions interpreting Parker the Court "fo-
cused on the challenged activity, not upon the identity of the parties
to the suit."'" The reading of Parker in Part II of the Court's opinion
was, he reasoned, unnecessary to its holding, as Parker simply did not
involve state action of the sort challenged in Cantor, where anticom-
petitive conduct in unregulated markets was required despite the
absence of an "independent regulatory purpose."2" The Chief Justice
concluded that no federal or state policy would be served by finding
a state action exemption on the facts presented in Cantor.
In a somewhat more lengthy concurring opinion, Mr. Justice
Blackmun also agreed with the result reached by the plurality. 0' His
approach, however, differs from that found in Mr. Justice Stevens'
opinion. First, Mr. Justice Blackmun saw the principal question fac-
ing the Court in Cantor as that of the Sherman Act's preemptive
effect on state law, and he agreed with the dissent that the question
is primarily one of congressional intent. 2 Nevertheless, he refused to
share the dissent's view that the legislative history of the Sherman
"I Id. at 3123 (Burger, C.J. concurring).
1' Id. at 3124 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
' Id. at 3128 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.).
' Id. at 3123 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 3124.
21 Id. at 3124 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
02 Id.
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Act is useful in evaluating that intent. Rather, in Mr. Justice Black-
mun's view, statements by framers of the Act reflect only the opinion,
prevailing in 1890, that Congress lacked the power to regulate intra-
state economic activity. Moreover, consistent with Supreme Court
holdings that Congress intended the reach of the Sherman Act to
expand along with that of the Commerce Clause 0 3 power, the ex-
tended ambit of the antitrust laws has brought them into conflict
with state laws once thought to be beyond their reach." 4 Mr. Justice
Blackmun stated that inconsistent state laws are preempted by the
federal antitrust statutes in such situations."5
To say that the Sherman Act generally preempts conflicting state
laws, Mr. Justice Blackmun continued, "is not to answer the much
more difficult question as to which such laws are preempted and to
what extent." ' Thus, the prerequisite established in Goldfarb, that
a state law require rather than simply authorize the challenged con-
duct, is not alone sufficient to confer an exemption.0 7 Similarly, it is
not decisive that the impetus of a particular state regulatory scheme
originated in the private sector, especially since it may often be im-
possible to identify the origin of a statute or rule.0 8 Finally, Mr.
13 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8.
" 96 S. Ct. at 3124, citing Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 96 S. Ct.
1848 (1976).
"I Id. at 3124 n.1, n.2, citing Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341
U.S. 384, 386 (1951) ("[When a state compels retailers to follow a parallel price
policy, it demands private conduct which the Sherman Act forbids.") and Northern
Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 350 (1904) ("[N]o State can endow any of
its corporations, or any combination of its citizens, with authority to restrain interstate
or international commerce .... ").
After discussing Schwegmann and Northern Securities, Mr. Justice Blackmun
concludes
. ..that some degree of state law preemption is implicit in the
most fundamental operation of the Sherman Act. If a State had no
antitrust policy of its own, anticompetitive combinations of all kinds
would be sanctioned and enforced under that State's general contract
and corporation law. Yet, there has never been any doubt that if such
combinations offend the Sherman Act, they are illegal, and state laws
to that extent are overridden.
96 S. Ct. at 3125 (footnote omitted). Mr. Justice Blackmun then proceeded to bolster
this conclusion by noting that, if inconsistent state laws were not preempted by the
Sherman Act, Congress would not have found it necessary to pass such statutes as the
Miller-Tydings Amendment, 15 U.S.C. § 1, 50 Stat. 693, the McGuire Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 45(a)(2)(5) (1970), 66 Stat. 632, and the McCarran-Ferguson Act 15 U.S.C. §
1011 et seq. (1970), 59 Stat. 34.




Justice Blackmun determined that a standard requiring "some de-
gree of affirmative articulation by the state of its conscientious intent
to sanction the challenged scheme, and its reasons therefor" would
also be inadequate." 9 In lieu of one of these relatively simple,
outcome-determinative standards, Mr. Justice Blackmun would
apply a rule of reason analysis, "taking it as a general proposition
that state-sanctioned anticompetitive activity must fall like any
other if its potential harms outweigh its benefits. 210 Applying this
balancing test to Detroit Edison's light bulb exchange program, Mr.
Justice Blackmun had no trouble deciding that, whatever the bene-
fits of the plan might be, they did not justify a finding of immunity. 1
6. The Dissent
In a lengthy dissent joined in by Justices Powell and Rehnquist,
Mr. Justice Stewart forcefully and meticulously attacked the reason-
ing of the plurality opinion, 12 and disagreed sharply with the result
reached by a majority of the Court.1 The tone of the dissent was set
in its first paragraph, where Mr. Justice Stewart stated:
2mId.
211 Id. Mr. Justice Blackmun compared his proposed benefit-harm analysis to the
rationality test used in certain equal protection cases. In this connection, he implied
that the mere fact of enactment would weigh on the "benefit" side of the scales, thus
suggesting that to some unspecified degree the federal courts should defer to the
judgment of state legislatures. Presumably, a state statute appearing on its face to
conflict with federal antitrust policy would receive less deference than one apparently
consistent with that policy. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938).
Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Blackmun would be reluctant to find that a statute
whose justification was "at all substantial" is preempted by the antitrust laws.
A particularly strong justification exists for a state-sanctioned scheme
if the State in effect has substituted itself for the forces of competition,
and regulates private activity to the same ends sought to be achieved
by the Sherman Act. Thus, an anticompetitive scheme which the
State institutes on the plausible ground that it will improve the per-
formance of the market in fostering efficient resource allocation and
low prices can scarcely be assailed.
96 S. Ct. at 3127.
22 Id. at 3127-28.
2 Id. at 3128 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In addition to rejecting the arguments of
the plurality opinion, a running battle with Mr. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion
is conducted in the footnotes to Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent. See 96 S. Ct. at 3129
n.4 and 3139 n.25.
21 Both the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result
reached by the Court. Thus, a total of six justices agreed that the decision of the court
of appeals should be reversed, and the case remanded to the district court. The formu-
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I respectfully dissent from this unprecedented application of
the federal antitrust laws, which will surely result in disruption
of the operation of every state-regulated public utility com-
pany in the Nation and in the creation of the prospect of mas-
sive treble damage liabilities payable ultimately by the Com-
pany's customers."'
Parker v. Brown"' provided the starting point for the dissent's
analysis of the Cantor case. To Mr. Justice Stewart, the plurality's
reliance on the "legislative history" of the Parker opinion, which
provided the basis for the conclusion that Parker held only that the
state itself could not be sued under the Sherman Act,' was both
improper and inadequate. 1 7 The dissenting justices agreed that the
narrowing of Parker endorsed by the plurality would "trivialize that
case to the point of overruling it. ' sl2 Moreover, Mr. Justice Stewart
reasoned that the narrow view of Parker taken by the plurality is
refuted by subsequent Supreme Court cases interpreting the state
action doctrine, as well as by the sources on which the plurality
relied. For example, in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 21 the Court viewed Parker as holding that
lation of the proper test to be applied in state action cases, set forth in Part HI of Mr.
Justice Stevens' opinion, represented the view of only five justices. Mr. Justice Black-
mun articulated a different test, which would require a benefit-harm analysis. Finally,
Parts II and IV of Mr. Justice Stevens' opinion, which concluded that Parker v. Brown
applies only when the conduct of state officials or agencies is challenged, were written
on behalf of a four-justice plurality of the Court.
2I Id. at 3129 (footnote omitted).
21 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
" See 96 S. Ct. at 3114-17. (Stevens, J.).
21? Id. at 3129-32 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
2I1 Id. at 3129 (footnote omitted). The dissent also criticizes Mr. Justice Black-
mun's statement that he sees "no reason to disapprove the holding in Parker," id. at
3128 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring), on the ground that his concurring opinion does
in effect reject Parker.
Mr. Justice Blackmun's position is that the Sherman Act does pro-
hibit all state-imposed restraints which do not satisfy the Sherman
Act's 'rule of reason' - a view quite different from the holding in
Parker. The fact that the result in Parker could have been reached by
a different route ... is simply irrelevant.
Id. at 3129 n.4 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The dissent also ex-
pressed curiosity at the willingness of five justices to "emasculate" the Parker holding,
which in its view had been reaffirmed by the Court's recent decision in Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
To the dissent, the narrowing of Parker was inconsistent not only with the legislative
history of the Sherman Act, but also with long standing principles of stare decisis. Id.
at 3129 n.4, citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 n.14 (1974).
219 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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"where a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid
governmental action, as opposed to private action, no violation of the
Act can be made out. 220 Similarly, it was clear to the dissent that,
in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,2' the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that in some circumstances the Parker v. Brown defense would
immunize private conduct. 22 Thus, Mr. Justice Stewart concluded
that "[1]itigation testing the limits of the state action exemption has
focused on whether alleged anticompetitive conduct by private par-
ties is indeed 'the result of' state action.
'M
Accordingly, to the dissent, the proper disposition of Cantor Was
dictated by the Court's prior holdings in Parker, Noerr and Goldfarb.
The regulatory process. at issue has three principal stages.
First, the utility company proposes a tariff. Second, the Michi-
gan Public Service Commission investigates the proposed tar-
iff and either approves it or rejects it. Third, if the tariff is
approved, the utility company must, under command of state
law, provide service in accord with its requirements until or
unless the Commission approves a modification. The utility
company thus engages in two distinct activities: it proposes a
tariff and, if the tariff is approved, it obeys its terms. The first
action cannot give rise to antitrust liability under Noerr and
the second - compliance with the terms of the tariff under the
command of state law - is immune from antitrust liability
under Parker and Goldfarb.12
Mr. Justice Stewart concluded that, by rejecting this conclusion, the
plurality had overruled "not only Parker but the entire body of post-
2 Id. at 136 (footnote omitted). To the Court in Noerr, it was "clear that the
Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from associating together in an
attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take particular action with
respect to a law that would produce a restraint or monopoly." Id.
1 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
2 96 S. Ct. at 3132-33 (Stewart, J., dissenting), citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-91 (1975).
m 96 S. Ct. at 3132. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"2 Id. at 3133 (footnote omitted). The plurality's reliance on Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), was viewed as misplaced. The Court had held in
Jackson that a utility's discontinuance of service to a customer for nonpayment of bills
was not "state action" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The dissenting opinion viewed this constitutional holding as irrelevant
to the question whether a utility's conduct in compliance with a tariff constitutes
"state action" for purposes of Sherman Act liability. Thus, the latter question was
characterized as one of legislative intent, properly answered on the basis of a separate
line of authority, i.e., decisions such as Parker and Noerr. Id. at 3133 n.10.
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Parker case law in this area, including Noerr. "225
Mr. Justice Stewart then described the two-part test fashioned by
the plurality. In his view, the test would focus first on whether it
would be unjust to subject state-regulated utilities to antitrust liabil-
ity, and second, on whether the "antitrust standards" implicit in the
Sherman Act were meant to be superimposed on conduct compelled
by state regulatory authority.2 6 In the light of the Chief Justice's
concurring opinion, a majority of the Court had approved the new
test, at least in situations where the challenged conduct, though re-
quired by the state, is only incidental to the state's regulatory pur-
poses.
The new test, according to the dissent, is plainly inconsistent with
the rationale of Noerr. m Under the first part of its test, the majority
had concluded that Detroit Edison's "participation" in the decision-
making process that led to mandatory implementation of the lamp
exchange program was significant, and consequently, that there was
nothing "unjust" about requiring the company to comply with fed-
eral antitrust laws. To accord an antitrust exemption to private per-
sons complying with state rules or orders only if those rules or orders
were adopted as the result of the state's unilateral decision, to the
dissent, would conflict squarely with the teaching of Noerr and would
penalize the First Amendment right to petition.
29
m' Id. at 3133.
22 Id. at 3133-34.
2n Id. Thus, even though the Michigan Public Service Commission undoubtedly
had the authority to compel Detroit Edison's compliance with the lamp supply pro-
gram, the regulatory purposes of the Commission were unrelated to the competitive
market for the retail sale of light bulbs. The five-justice majority seemed to say that,
to the extent the Commission's order had an anticompetitive impact outside the "tar-
get area" of its regulatory mandate, actions taken in compliance with that order would
not enjoy an exemption from the antitrust laws. See text accompanying note 186 supra.
m Id. at 3134. The Noerr case held that concerted attempts to influence public
officials (i.e., lobbying) are protected by the First Amendment right to petition, and
do not violate the Sherman Act. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961). The holding in Noerr, together with that in United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), is generally referred to as the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. See note 82 supra.
2n 96 S. Ct. at 3134 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Stewart viewed the
burden placed on the right to petition by Cantor as having economic as well as consti-
tutional significance.
Today's holding will not only penalize the right to petition but may
very well strike a crippling blow at state utility regulation. As the
Court seems to acknowledge, such regulation is heavily dependent on
the active participation of the regulated parties, who typically propose
tariffs which are either adopted, rejected, or modified by utility com-
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS
Moreover, the dissent viewed the second arm of the Court's new
immunity test as "a vehicle for ad hoc judicial determinations of the
substantive validity of state regulatory goals, which closely resembles
the discarded doctrine of substantive due process."' 0 The Court's
references to the doctrine of implied repeal, represented by cases such
as Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange,2' were dismissed by the
dissent as inapposite.232 First, the dissent noted that the Supremacy
Clause2 3 prohibits the implied repeal of federal statutes by inconsist-
ent state laws.23 Second and of more concern to the dissenters, the
Court's new standard would
...allow the federal judiciary to substitute its judgment for
that of state legislatures and administrative agencies with re-
spect to whether particular anticompetitive regulatory provi-
sions are 'sufficiently central,' . . .to a judicial conception of
the proper scope of state utility regulation. 5
Mr. Justice Stewart viewed this approach as radically different from
that employed in Gordon and the implied repeal cases,26 and further-
missions. But if a utility can escape the unpredictable consequences
of the second arm of the Court's new test. . . only by playing possum
- by exercising no 'options' in the Court's terminology. . .96 S. Ct.
at 3118 - then it will surely be tempted to do just that, posing a
serious threat to efficient and effective regulation.
Id. at 3134.
' Id. at 3134, citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). See generally
Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75
COLUM. L. Rv. 328 (1975).
=1 422 U.S. 659 (1975). Other cases involving the doctrine include United States
v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975); United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963);
Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 994 (1971). For a discussion of the implied repeal doctrine as it applies to
conflicts between the federal antitrust and securities laws, see Shenefield, Annual
Survey of Antitrust Developments 1974-75, 33 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 259, 298-316
(1976).
21 96 S. Ct. at 3135.
= U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
21 96 S. Ct. at 3135.
21 Id. at 3136, (quoting the opinion of the Court at 3120 n.37 (Stevens, J.)).
m 96 S. Ct. at 3135. Referring to Gordon and the implied repeal cases, the dissent
stated:
Those cases turned exclusively on issues of statutory construction and
involved no judicial scrutiny of the abstract 'necessity' or 'centrality'
of particular regulatory provisions. Instead, the federal regulatory
statute was accepted as a given, as was the federal antitrust law. The
Court's interpretative effort was aimed at accommodating these argu-
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more, as a judicial usurpation of state regulatory power contrary to
the expressed intentions of the framers of the Sherman Act.27
In summary, the dissent viewed the state action doctrine embod-
ied in Parker and Goldfarb as a fundamentally sound reconciliation
of the extensive jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act', with the
intention of its drafters that the Act not intrude on the regulatory
authority of the sovereign states. 39 After Cantor, however, state regu-
latory commands that, in the view of a federal court, are unnecessary
to the accomplishment of the regulatory purposes of the issuing au-
thority, will not confer antitrust immunity on those obeying them.
ably inconsistent bodies of law, not at second-guessing legislative
judgments concerning the 'necessity' for including particular provi-
sions in the regulatory statute.
Id. (emphasis added) To demonstrate that the Court's approach in Cantor was qualita-
tively different from that in Gordon and similar cases, the dissent quoted liberally the
plurality opinion's statements to the effect, e.g., that the lamp supply program was
not "imperative" to effective utility regulation, that utility regulation in Michigan
would be able to "function effectively" without the program, and that the Cantor
decision would leave Michigan's interest in regulating electric utilities "almost entirely
unimpaired." See 96 S. Ct. at 3120 (Stevens, J.) (emphasis added).
227 96 S. Ct. at 3136-40. Quoting extensively from the legislative history of the
Sherman Act, the dissent concludes that the drafters of the Act intended its reach to
be coextensive with that of the commerce power, see 20 Cong. Rec. 1167 (1889), yet
did not intend to "interfere with" state laws designed to "prevent and control combina-
tions within the limits of the State." 21 Cong. Rec. 2456 (1890) (emphasis added by
Mr. Justice Stewart). Rather, the Sherman Act was designed to supplement state
regulatory efforts, which by necessity could not reach activities in other states. 96 S.
Ct. at 3137.
The retroactive extension of the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act, occa-
sioned by expansive interpretations of the Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), was in large part responsible for
the genesis of the Parker doctrine. Thus, the post-New Deal concept of interstate
commerce "created a potential for serious conflict between state statutes regulating
commerce which, in 1890, would have been considered 'domestic' but which, in 1942,
were viewed as falling within the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act." 96 S. Ct.
at 3139. To the dissent, the state action doctrine of Parker v. Brown, as clarified by
Goldfarb, provided the best possible accommodation between the "clearly expressed
congressional intent not to intrude on the regulatory authority of the States" and the
"judicial expansion of the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act." Id. at 3139.
See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 96 S. Ct. 1848 (1976).
2' In this connection, the dissent rejected Mr. Justice Stevens' view that the
framers of the Sherman Act intended to exempt only compliance with state commands
fashioned to regulate a firm's actions within the scope of its natural monopoly powers.
96 S. Ct. at 3119 (Stevens, J.). Referring to this assertion as a "Delphic reading of the
Sherman Act," Mr. Justice Stewart observed that the state regulatory scheme chal-
lenged in Parker restrained conduct in a market that, far from being a natural monop-
oly, was thought to be too competitive. Id. at 3136 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Thus, despite the plurality's lengthy discourse on "fairness," the dis-
sent emphasized the simple fact that, after Cantor, a regulated com-
pany "may be subjected to treble damages as a penalty for its compli-
ance with state law.
'240
C. State Action After Cantor: The New Test and Its Implications
The antitrust laws, and especially the Sherman Act,24' have long
been characterized as constitutional in scope.2 4 2 Therefore, like judi-
cial interpretations of the most sweeping constitutional provisions,
major antitrust decisions frequently raise many more questions than
they answer. 243 Parker v. Brown211 was such a case. For more than
three decades Parker reigned as the benchmark against which count-
less courts measured the validity of an antitrust defendant's assertion
of the "state action" defense. The Supreme Court's 1975 decision in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar2 5 refined the concept of state action,
making it clear that the exemption would apply only to conduct
required, and not merely authorized, by a state. But while it nar-
rowed the state action defense, Goldfarb left the rationale of Parker
basically intact.
Rather than making further refinements to the Parker-Goldfarb
concept of state action, the Court's recent decision in Cantor v. De-
troit Edison Co. 211 appears to have superimposed several additional
strata of substantive inquiry onto the analytical foundation laid in
Parker and Goldfarb. Moreover, the Parker-Goldfarb test for state
action has been relegated to the status of a threshold inquiry, possibly
with little bearing on the ultimate question whether conduct com-
manded by the state should be immune from antitrust attack. Cantor
is thus probably a major decision, one that may have profound effects
on private antitrust enforcement and on state economic regulation.
While delineation of its precise impact must await judicial interpre-
tation of its dictates, for purposes of this survey it is appropriate to
2I0 Id. at 3140-43 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
211 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
21 E.g., United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 595, 610 (1972).
2I An excellent example, unrelated to our discussion here, is the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). The per se
rule apparently enunciated in Schwinn is the subject of countless lower court decisions,
which have sought to define its reach on the one hand, and have created an array of
exceptions to the rule on the other. See Note, Exceptions to Schwinn's Per Se Rule:
Their Validity and Implications for the Future, 31 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 643 (1974).
241 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
243 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
246 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
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examine what appears to be the "new test" fashioned in Cantor and
to discuss generally some of the decision's likely ramifications." 7
1. The Post-Cantor Requisites of the State Action Exemption
At the outset, it should be noted that the Cantor opinion does not
set forth, in step-by-step fashion, the requirements that must be met
before private conduct required by state law will be exempted from
antitrust liability. Nevertheless, the opinion does suggest that a num-
ber of distinct inquiries are necessary to test the validity of a particu-
lar state action defense.
First, preceding even the "threshold inquiry" referred to in
Goldfarb24 8 is the question of the Sherman Act's preemptive effect on
inconsistent state statutes. It is clear from the language of Parker v.
Brown,249 and from other decisions of the Supreme Court, 0 that at
least some state laws are so irreconcilable with the Sherman Act as
to be unenforceable. 5' Yet, it is equally clear that the antitrust laws
were not intended to sweep aside all state economic regulation, or the
state action defense would never have evolved.252 Although many
statutes arguably inconsistent with the Sherman Act may be uncon-
247 Unfortunately, a detailed analysis of the many subtle implications of the
Cantor case is beyond the scope of this survey. Some of the areas in which Cantor may
create problems have already been discussed by other commentators. The authors
would refer the reader interested in pursuing these questions to, inter alia, the follow-
ing articles: Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action
Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1976); Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Anti-
trust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 328 (1975); Kintner & Kauf-
mann, The State Action Antitrust Immunity Defense 23 AM. U. L. REv. 527 (1974);
Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 693 (1973); Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A For-
mula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U. L. REv. 71 (1974); Donnem, Federal
Antitrust Law v. Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39 ANTITRUST L. J. 950 (1970);
Note, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L. J. 1164 (1975).
2,1 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975).
2, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) ("True, a state does not give immunity to those who
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their
action is lawful .... ").
E.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); North-
ern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
1, In his concurring opinion in Cantor, Mr. Justice Blackmun stated that where
such laws have been invalidated, it is because they have been preempted by the
Sherman Act. 96 S. Ct. at 3124-25 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
"I If the Sherman Act had been intended to preempt the field, only state regula-
tory programs having no effect on interstate commerce could be permissible. In that
event, the "state action" defense would not exist separate and apart from the defense
that the challenged conduct had no effect on interstate commerce.
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stitutional for reasons independent of this inconsistency,. 3 as far as
conflicts with federal antitrust policy are concerned the line between
permissible and impermissible state regulation has never been clearly
drawn. Obviously, if a statute is so repugnant to federal antitrust
policy that it cannot be enforced, the question of state action immun-
ity will never arise. But it remains unclear, after Cantor, what criteria
a state regulatory statute must satisfy in order to avoid preemption
by the federal antitrust laws. Implicit in the Cantor opinion, of
course, is the assumption that the regulatory statutes governing
Michigan's electric utilities are at least presumptively constitutional,
and it seems safe to assume that similar legislation enacted by other
states is also valid.2
4
Assuming that the conduct challenged in a given case is taken
pursuant to a state regulatory scheme that is enforceable despite its
potential conflicts with federal antitrust policy, the question arises
whether such conduct is immune from the antitrust laws. After
Cantor, it is possible that the question whether the anticompetitive
activity has been "required by the State acting as sovereign" may be
no more than a "threshold inquiry."' 5 Thus, while there could be no
state action exemption for conduct that is merely authorized, and not
commanded, by a, state, a finding that this threshold inquiry is satis-
fied will not automatically confer immunity.21
Moreover, it is unclear precisely which commands are those of the
"State acting as sovereign." Certainly the state is acting as sovereign
when conduct is required by an express statutory command. But
there is less certainty, for example, where anticompetitive action is
taken in compliance with orders or regulations promulgated by a
state agency.27 The Court in Cantor seems to have passed over these
and other uncertainties inherent in this threshold inquiry, preferring
to address them in subsequent stages of its analysis.
Having determined that anticompetitive conduct is required by
state law, the Cantor Court next inquired whether it would be "un-
just" to subject a private party to treble damages for its compliance
21 E.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976). Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). See also Consumers
Union, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, No. 75-0105-R (E.D. Va., filed Feb. 27, 1975).
211 It should be noted that it may be argued from Cantor that only state laws of
the sort in force when the Sherman Act was passed are presumptively valid. See text
accompanying note 166 supra.
2 Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3121, (1976), citing Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975).
21 See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3121-22 (1976).
21 See id. at 3117-18 (1976).
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with the state's commands. For purposes of this inquiry, the Court
assumed "that it would be unacceptable ever to impose statutory
liability on a party who had done nothing more than obey a state
command."' 8 This fairness inquiry, it seems, turns on the extent to
which the defendant has participated in the decision-making process
that led to the adoption and enforcement of the statute or rule requir-
ing the conduct under attack.29 In Cantor the defendant's participa-
tion was held to be "sufficiently significant" to require that its con-
duct, like similar conduct by unregulated firms, comply with the
federal antitrust laws.20 The Court itself acknowledged that, by this
standard, few defendants would ever gain immunity for having done
"nothing more" than obey a state command.2 1
Thus, the Court indicated in Cantor that the fact of participation
by a regulated company in a decision-making process, which ulti-
mately results in the promulgation of orders or regulations binding
on that company, is somehow relevant to the question whether the
company's actions taken in compliance with those regulations should
be immune from antitrust challenge. This seems ill-advised for a
number of reasons. For instance, as a practical matter, the regulatory
process involves so much interaction between the regulators and the
regulated that it may often be impossible to pinpoint the source of a
given rule or order.8 2 Moreover, to premise a finding of antitrust
liability on the fact that a private party sought to participate in the
regulatory process can only discourage such participation, and this is
significant for two reasons, one constitutional and one economic.
First, by discouraging participation in the regulatory process, Cantor
effectively discourages the exercise of the First Amendment right to
petition the government.2"' The plurality offers little solace to those
concerned about this implication of its holding, stating in effect that
only those firms that succeed in influencing the regulatory process
need fear antitrust liability."4 Second, lessened participation by regu-
lated firms in the decisions that affect them may have the additional
consequence of depriving regulatory agencies of access to a substan-
21 Id. at 3117 (emphasis added).
21 This inquiry had been foreshadowed by the Woods Exploration and George R.
Whitten cases. See text accompanying notes 86 & 95 supra.
"° 96 S. Ct. at 3119.
" Id. at 3118. The Court questioned whether the inquiry would ever "decide any
actual case."
"I Id. at 3126 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
213 See, e.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1965).
266 96 S. Ct. at 3122-23.
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tial body of expertise about the very industries they are charged with
regulating. This potential development would probably bode ill both
for the regulated companies and the public they serve.
Nevertheless, such companies may find themselves compelled to
withdraw from at least certain facets of the regulatory decision-
making process, in order to limit their antitrust exposure. Under
Cantor, if this withdrawal results in the state's participation in a
decision being "so dominant that it would be unfair to hold a private
party responsible for his conduct implementing it,"265 then a case for
immunity, at least from treble damage liability, will have been made
out. In this connection, it is significant that the Michigan Public
Service Commission approved the lamp supply program without any
review whatsoever, since lower courts may determine that when tariff
provisions are adopted by regulatory agencies after a meaningful re-
view process, the state's role becomes "so dominant" that some sort
of immunity is required.2 66 Thus, the "fairness" standard mandated
in Cantor provides fertile ground for a resurgence of the state action
defense.
261
In any event, the analysis suggested by Cantor requires one more
step if it is determined that subjecting a defendant to treble damage
liability for action taken in compliance with state law would not be
unjust. At this point the question becomes whether, despite the fact
that the imposition of liability would not be unjust, the existence of
the state's regulatory command should give rise to an implied exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws. According to Cantor, the standards for
ascertaining the "existence and scope" of such an implied exemption
must be at least as severe as those applied when federal regulatory
legislation conflicts with the antitrust laws. In such situations, the
Supreme Court has refused to find an exemption unless such treat-
ment is necessary to make the regulatory act work, and even then,
the exemption is granted only to the minimum extent necessary. 26 As
the dissent points out,2 169 this standard of necessity requires some
2 Id. at 3119.
See, e.g., Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
217 While there is little doubt that Cantor and Goldfarb have essentially overruled
cases like Washington Gas Light, see text accompanying notes 69-74 supra, the state
action exemption may still be granted, consistent with Cantor, in situations like that
presented in the Georgia Power case, where regulation results from the "considered
judgment of the state regulatory authority." See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
2 Id. at 3120, citing, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422
U.S. 694, 720 (1975).
21 96 S. Ct. at 3135-36 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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judicial divination of the purposes underlying a state regulatory
scheme since, unless the purposes are defined, it is impossible to
ascertain whether the anticompetitive conduct ordered by the state
is "necessary to make the regulatory act work." The process will
necessarily entail some judicial review of state legislative and agency
judgments concerning the "necessity" for particular conduct in the
light of underlying regulatory goals. 20 Under this standard, the na-
ture of the private conduct required and its relationship to legitimate
regulatory objectives, rather than the fact that the conduct has been
commanded by the state, may be crucial.
The standard for finding an implied exemption may be less rigor-
ous, on the other hand, if the defendant is a state agency or a member
of a state regulatory commission rather than a private person. Al-
though the Cantor decision does not expressly formulate a standard
applicable to "public defendants," the plurality does purport to nar-
row Parker v. Brown to the proposition that "action taken by state
officials pursuant to express legislative command" does not violate
the Sherman Act.2 ' Moreover, in Goldfarb, the Virginia State Bar
incurred antitrust liability because its actions "foster[ing] anticom-
petitive practices for the benefit of its members" did not further the
"limited purposes" for which it was a state agency.2 2 Thus, at least
where the defendant is a regulatory agency or a full-time regulatory
official, there would seem to be an exemption for conduct taken either
pursuant to an express legislative command, or within the scope of a
valid grant of regulatory authority.
73
Where the public defendant plays a dual role, however, the stan-
dards are less clear. For example, if a member of a regulatory com-
mission is also a sometime officer of one of the firms the commission
regulates, or a member of a profession regulated by the commission,
his conduct as a regulator may be subject to the antitrust laws even
270 See id. at 3135 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Verkuil, State Action, Due
Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 328 (1975).
Of course, if on examination the purposes of the state regulatory statute are found
to be impermissible in the light of federal antitrust policy, the statute itself may be
unenforceable. See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384
(1951). While Cantor did not hold that the tariff requiring Detroit Edison to implement
the lamp supply program was unenforceable, it seems quite possible that, in the future,
utilities themselves may have to challenge the enforceability of some regulations in
order to limit their antitrust exposure.
21 See text accompanying notes 155-63 supra.
212 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975).
21 Cf. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972).
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though clearly within the scope of his statutory authority. This result
will be particularly likely if the members of a regulatory body take
action that, though authorized, may redound to their personal bene-
fit.24 Of course, the identity of a particular state official, like the fact
of participation in the regulatory process by private persons, while
apparently significant for purposes of post-Cantor state action deci-
sions, seems wholly irrelevant to the justification for a particular
regulatory requirement from the standpoint of state economic policy.
In summary, the standards applicable to a determination whether
conduct commanded by a state should be exempt from the antitrust
laws may be considerably more complicated in the post-Cantor
world. And correspondingly, assertion of the state action doctrine as
a defense to antitrust claims, at least where the conduct commanded
is not clearly necessary to the implementation of a legitimate regula-
tory scheme, will be much more difficult for both "public" and "pri-
vate" antitrust defendants. The various analyses seemingly required
by the melding of Cantor with Parker and Goldfarb contain many
areas of uncertainty, one or more of which may enable subsequent
decisions to restore some vitality to the state action defense. Assum-
ing, however, that the preceding synopsis of the Cantor "test" is
fundamentally accurate, we turn to a brief consideration of Cantor's
implications.
2. Cantor's Implications for the Future
With its four separate opinions and multiple legal approaches,
Cantor has produced a dimension of uncertainty that is its primary
weakness. The inability of courts to provide clearer guidelines for
business firms which rely on predictability as to the future is one of
the costs extracted by our system of case-by-case resolution of busi-
ness disputes. Courts do have an obligation to attempt to be as clear
as possible when treating the legality of conventional business con-
duct. This is all the more true when, as in Cantor, firms must choose
between what may be conflicting laws at the federal and state level,
with penalities and forfeitures attaching to either course of conduct.
In an area of such great uncertainty and hazard, the failure of the
Court in Cantor to speak more clearly is particularly disappointing.
The uncertainty is fostered by the absence of any basis on which
to predict the preempting effects of the federal antitrust laws.?
5 Jus-
" See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975); Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578 (1973).
21 See note 254 supra.
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tice Blackmun's opinion deals with the question directly, but he seeks
a rule of reason approach, weighing harms and benefits, a process
with which, the Justice suggests, federal courts are well acquainted
in the antitrust field. The fact that no other Justice joined this
suggestion is significant enough, but even more important is the use-
lessness of such a test to guide the day-to-day practical behavior of
business firms in the marketplace. It is one thing to say to a firm that
its conduct will be judged under a rule of reason that balances busi-
ness justifications against laws designed to protect competition, so
that the desirability of competition in a particular area can be as-
sessed in advance with some accuracy by businessmen who know the
area best. It is quite another thing to say that state statutes will be
weighed according to harms and benefits that must be quantified on
the basis of the validity and seriousness, in the eyes of a federal court,
of competing policy objectives at different levels of our federal sys-
tem.
Admittedly, situations of conflict do occur within our legal sys-
tem. In the area of race relations years. ago, state statutes required
conduct that was clearly forbidden by federal law. The distinguishing
characteristic of that kind of conflict was that the inarticulate moral
imperatives found within the conscience of each American citizen
were the best possible guides to federal constitutional law. That can
scarcely be duplicated where the conflict is between competition, on
the one hand, and regulation of natural monopolies on the other, and
where violation of the antitrust laws may result in a felony conviction,
while violation of a regulatory order may result in loss of the license
to stay in business.
Clearly, one of the major implications of Cantor is that regulated
industries will be forced to seek through the legislative process the
kind of legal framework that the Cantor Court might find acceptable.
There is, for instance, in the concurrence of Justice Blackmun a
suggestion that state law may be preempted unless it has been saved
by a congressionally created exception, such as the McCarran-
Ferguson Act20 in the insurance industry. Some such mechanisms for
a more reliable accommodation between federal antitrust policy and
state regulation are certainly in order. For state economic regulation
is now clearly at risk in the absence of such a federal sanction, at any
moment subject to being held preempted by federal law with attend-
ant antitrust liability for all participants, state officials as well as
private firms. In light of Cantor, Congress must accept responsibility
,,1 15 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq. (1970).
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for creating an appropriate method of resolving the conflict, which
operates clearly, in advance, and with maximum predictability.
Whether Congress in its current mood of antitrust fervor will find it
congenial to establish limitations on the antitrust laws, even though
they are designed to sanction existing and conventionally acceptable
state economic regulation, is as yet unclear.
An alternative is to seek a legislative solution that puts all eco-
nomic regulation, even that governing state and local activity, at the
federal level. One solution in the electric utility context described in
Cantor might be to make the Federal Power Commission, for in-
stance, responsible for the nationwide regulation of retail electric
rates and services, thus removing state government from the business
of electric utility regulation entirely. Alternatively, the federal gov-
ernment might choose to make delegate agencies of all state regula-
tory commissions, thus clothing their actions with the immunizing
protection of federal authority. But nationalizing the business of eco-
nomic regulation reverses 200 years of federalism and seems even less
likely than our present institutions to accomplish the valid ends of
regulation. Admittedly, federally regulated industries might be less
subject to the unresolved conflicts between antitrust and regulation,
since these would apparently be harmonized according to the princi-
ples worked out in such cases as Gordon,2" NASD,28 and Ricci.29
Nevertheless, it is hard to be persuaded that the best interests of the
nation's economy will have been served by centralizing all economic
regulation in Washington, D.C.
The implications of Cantor for the shape and content of state
legislation, assuming some economic regulation is to be left at the
state level, are also as yet unforeseen. Relying as heavily as the case
does on the explicit requirements of state legislation, apparently the
only totally safe state regulatory structure is that embodied in a
detailed and comprehensive statute. To put the onus for developing
detailed regulatory policy on the legislature, however, is to turn back
the clock in administrative practice, and to ignore the practical ne-
cessities that originally forced inexpert legislatures to delegate powers
to administrative agencies or forego regulation altogether.
If Cantor indeed requires state statutes to reach that level of spe-
cificity, anyone familiar with the political process is likely to see the
effort as a hopeless one. As a practical matter, it is difficult enough
to persuade legislatures to deal even with general subjects on a coher-
2n Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
21 United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
' Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
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ent basis, much less to achieve consensus on the detailed provisions
of a regulatory scheme for a highly specialized industry. Perhaps
more importantly, predictability will have vanished if the legislature
is itself to be the regulator, since intricate and unpopular decisions
may be reversed by majority vote.
Equally as unattractive is the implication of Cantor for participa-
tion of private individuals in the regulatory process. The present
pattern of regulation at both the federal and the state levels assumes
substantial participation by private firms. Quite frequently, the initi-
ation of various regulatory actions is at the hands of the regulated
firm. Nothing about that should strike the observer as sinister or
unethical, since the administrative pattern is typically one of appli-
cation and approval. Moreover, the regulated firms frequently have
access to expertise and other resources that are helpful in making
sensible administrative decisions.
And yet Cantor seems to base liability on, among other things, the
precise degree of participation by private firms or private individuals
in the regulatory process. The inevitable tendency may be for private
firms and private individuals to withdraw from the process, which in
turn would deprive regulatory authorities of the expertise and data
that are sometimes plentiful in the private sector. Furthermore, regu-
lation has never sought to "plan," as that word is used by economic
policymakers, but instead has left as much scope for private initiative
as possible within the regulated context. The dual characteristics of
control without loss of private initiative, which are part of the unique
genius of American regulation, will inevitably be sacrificed if private
firms are forced into silence and acquiesence in the regulatory pro-
cess.
Nevertheless, the tendency to withdraw after Cantor will be felt.
Participation in the regulatory process by private firms will surely
become less useful, less constructive, more grudging. For every inci-
dent of participation may be the very item that will be seen by the
courts as tipping the balance in favor of antitrust liability.
The Cantor decision is also disquieting because it seems to be at
war with the central premise of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.20 If
the trigger of private liability is participation in the administrative
process, and nothing more, then the First Amendment no longer pro-
tects the private firm's right to petition government agencies,
whether it be for a rate change, a certification of a new service or for
a particular method of light bulb distribution. Thus, Cantor seems
" See note 82 supra.
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to meld an activity by a private firm hitherto thought protected by
the First Amendment together with approval by a state regulatory
agency, itself apparently exempt from the antitrust laws, to construct
an antitrust violation for the private utility. As the dissent points out,
the right to petition has arguably been transmuted from a constitu-
tionally protected activity into the trigger of antitrust liability. It is
difficult to embrace that result in light of the multitude of different
ways in which private firms in this country communicate with, apply
to, or seek from every kind of government agency or authority, espe-
cially because it is certain that without private action, reaction and
interaction, the governmental process will suffer immeasurably.
Evidently, what the Court in Cantor sought was to put state regu-
lation on the same footing vis-a-vis the federal antitrust laws as fed-
eral regulation. In cases such as Silver,'2' Gordon, 2 NASD283 and the
like, the central question is whether the conduct approved by the
regulatory agency is central to the grant of regulatory authority, or
to put it differently, whether there is a direct repugnance between the
antitrust laws and the state regulatory scheme. The Cantor Court is
clearly engaged in that kind of inquiry when it decides that light bulb
distribution is unregulated by the State of Michigan, in spite of the
fact that the conduct of Detroit Edison in distributing light bulbs is
wholly subject to orders of the Michigan Public Service Commission.
The premise of the Court's examination can only be that state agen-
cies ought not to be able to repeal, by implication or otherwise, the
federal antitrust laws any more easily than federal agencies.
That premise, which sounds so plausible, is hardly self-evident,
however. The goal is to determine the intention of Congress. In a case
involving conflicts among federal policies, the Court might well
award priority to the antitrust laws. But in any balancing of federal
and state policies, an additional dimension that is sometimes charac-
terized as an incident of our federal system enters the equation. Of
course Congress has the power to override conflicting state law in
virtually every case. But the crucial question in the Cantor context
is whether Congress, on behalf of federal antitrust policy, showed
more deference to the interests of the states than to the policies of
federal agencies. The very concept of the federal system, together
with the familiar Brandeis notion that the states are testing grounds
for various governmental and regulatory experiments, would suggest
211 Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
2 Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
2 United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
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that identical standards in both sets of cases might not be appropri-
ate.
The basic concern after Cantor must be that, in an effort to
achieve preeminence for federal competition policy, the Court has
managed to jeopardize the efficacy of state regulation. The implica-
tions of Cantor are that state regulatory commissions are impotent
to protect regulated companies from conflicting legal regimes in the
absence of detailed legislative prescriptions, and that the regulated
firms put themselves into jeopardy by undertaking to cooperate with
the state regulatory authority. In attempting to solve a major prob-
lem of federalism by seeking the adjustment of conflicting economic
policies, the Court has created additional problems that can now in
all likelihood only be resolved in the halls of Congress.
II.
CONCLUSION
The year 1975-76 thus saw determined attempts on a variety of
fronts to exalt competition policy at the expense of regulation. In
Washington, both Court and legislature sought to prune away some
of the constraints that have been imposed on the effectiveness of
antitrust policy and enforcement. Cantor itself seems to point to new
difficulties for regulatory authorities and the firms they regulate, and
implies legal tests that make regulation both more inefficient and less
acceptable to the regulated industries. It is perhaps too much to
assume that the Court sees itself as cooperating with the proponents
of deregulation in Congress by attempting to array even the regulated
firms on the side of deregulation. And yet that may well be the result
of Cantor, which may make regulation so unattractive and so fraught
with pitfalls that even the regulated company prefers to see it end.
With firms free in a natural monopoly context to reap the benefits of
their market power, subsequent courts evaluating Cantor may well
wonder whether the decision was, in the end, wise. And legislators in
Congress studying deregulation proposals have the obligation to an-
swer the questions that Cantor raises before washing their hands of
regulation and a century of American economic history.
